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THE MARITAL WEALTH GAP
Erez Aloni
Abstract: Married couples are wealthier than people in all other family structures. The top
10% of wealth holders are, in great proportion, married. Even among the wealthiest
households, married couples hold significantly more wealth than others. The Article identifies
this phenomenon as the “Marital Wealth Gap,” and critiques the role of diverse legal
mechanisms in creating and maintaining it. Marriage also contributes to the concentration of
wealth because marriage patterns are increasingly assortative: wealth marries wealth. The law
entrenches or even exacerbates these class-based marriage patterns by erecting structural
barriers that hinder people from meeting across economic strata.
How can the state restructure the law to alleviate the marital wealth gap? The Article
proposes a fundamental shift in the way the state treats wealth and family status. It advances a
theory grounded in transformative “recognition and redistribution” that decentralizes
marriage’s monopoly on wealth-related benefits and simultaneously aims to reduce wealth
concentration among the richest households. Principally, since marriage is the preserve of the
well-off, the state should decouple wealth benefits from marriage. At the same time, it should
combat the structures that enable wealth concentration among affluent married couples,
thereby dismantling the architecture that supports the marital wealth gap.
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INTRODUCTION
Outward conditions oftenest rule in matching.
The laborer mates him with his like; the trader
A trader’s daughter weds; wealth marries wealth;
The courtier seeks his bride among the great.1
Married couples constitute the wealthiest family structure in the United
States, holding far more wealth than any other family type. 2 In fact,
households in the top 1% of the wealth distribution are most likely to be
comprised of married couples.3 To illustrate, only 3% of the world’s
billionaires, as featured in the Forbes list in 2013, were unmarried.4 The
link between wealth and marital status is not limited to the top 1%. The
next 9% of households by wealth are also composed primarily of married
1. GEORGE H. CALVERT, COMEDIES 85 (1856).
2. See infra Part II (presenting and analyzing data about family status and wealth accumulation).
3. THOMAS J. STANLEY, THE MILLIONAIRE MIND 23 (2001) (“[A] large majority . . . of
millionaires are married. Only 2 percent have never been married, and about 2 percent are currently
divorced or separated. The rest are widowed.”); Lisa A. Keister, The One Percent, 40 ANN. REV. SOC.
347, 356 (2014).
4. Edwin Durgy, The World’s 12 Most Eligible Billionaire Bachelors, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2013),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/edwindurgy/2013/03/06/the-worlds-12-most-eligible-billionairebachelors/#5456e2d130de [https://perma.cc/6NS6-NS5Y]. The Forbes list includes the richest people
in the world, while this Article focuses only on the United States. But the point is illustrative of the
trend in the United States; and, in any event, the United States is the most represented country in the
Forbes list.
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couples.5 The representation of married couples in the top 10% of wealth
holders is higher than it is in any other group along the descending line of
net wealth.6 Further, even among the wealthiest, married couples are
likely to hold significantly more wealth than their nonmarried
counterparts.7 This Article calls the accumulation of wealth among
married households in the top 10% (including the top 1%), in comparison
with all households in the bottom 90%, “the marital wealth gap.” It then
considers the gap’s causes and harms, and the possible solutions for
narrowing this gap.
What explains the success of married couples at the top of the wealth
distribution—compared with other families—in creating and retaining
wealth? Scholars who have examined the connection between wealth and
family structure have advanced two primary explanations: that marriage,
as a legal and societal framework, is the cause of this advantage;8 and that
economies of scale explain the relative success of married couples in
amassing wealth.9
But these accounts serve only as partial explanations. Supplementing
the existing interpretations, this Article reveals various legal mechanisms
that privilege married couples in the creation and retention of wealth. Put
differently, it exposes the various state policies that reinforce and amplify
the preexisting power and wealth inequalities that serve as the foundation
of the marital wealth gap. It shows that the law plays a crucial role in
bestowing advantages that increase the accumulation and retention of
wealth of married couples who are already well-off. To unveil aspects of
the law’s role, this Article creates a taxonomy of the primary mechanisms
by which marital status helps wealthy married couples to maximize their
wealth holding.10 It argues, then, that marriage is a tool for the
concentration of wealth, mainly benefiting those who already have
5. See infra Part II (providing data about wealth holding and family structure).
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. These scholars contend that married couples do better in terms of wealth holding because the
marital framework encourages the kind of responsible behavior that results in wealth accumulation.
See infra section III.A. This strand of scholarship, for the most part, has not aimed to think about
wealth inequality but only to advance the theory that marriage should be promoted as a solution to
poverty.
9. See, e.g., Allison Linn, Why Married People Tend to Be Wealthier: It’s Complicated, TODAY
(Feb. 13, 2013), https://www.today.com/money/why-married-people-tend-be-wealthier-itscomplicated-1C8364877 [https://perma.cc/A9TL-LCVU] (“Once they are married, the couples also
are able to take advantage of economies of scale. . . . [T]hose advantages go beyond just sharing
expenses. People who are married also are able to divide up responsibilities in financially beneficial
ways.”).
10. See infra section III.C.
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significant amounts of wealth. The marital wealth gap is a piece of the
larger puzzle of wealth inequality.
Exploring the connection between family structure and wealth
inequality—to be distinguished from income inequality11—is essential at
a time when the wealth gap in the United States is expanding
dramatically.12 Yet, the link between laws pertaining to regulation of the
household and wealth inequality remains underexplored and
undertheorized. Thus, one of this Article’s principal interventions is to
invite a shift in family law from a discourse focused more narrowly on
income inequality to one that also addresses the wealth gap.13
The analysis is interdisciplinary. That is, by “family law,” this Article
means more than the set of rules pertaining to marriage and divorce.
Instead, it embraces a broader definition—one that includes explicit and
implicit laws and norms that govern and impact the economics of the
household. In so doing, this Article joins a newer strand of scholarship
that views families as institutions affected by laws, norms, and economic
structures,14 and the field of family law as encompassing the universe of
laws, structures, norms, and institutions that affect the economics of the
household.15 Thus, the family law that this Article explores includes the
11. See infra Part I (discussing the differences between wealth and income, and arguing that
because wealth inequality is more enduring and unbalanced family law should pay attention to it, too).
12. Wealth inequality has become an immense problem in the United States: since the 1960s,
families at the tenth percentile of wealth holding have gone from holding no wealth to owing about
$1,000 in debt; meanwhile, the wealth of families in the ninetieth percentile has increased fivefold.
Nine Charts About Wealth Inequality in America (Updated), URBAN INST. (Oct. 5, 2017),
http://apps.urban.org/features/wealth-inequality-charts/ [https://perma.cc/39ZH-7KAP]; see infra
Part I (discussing wealth inequality in the United States).
13. See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING
THE AMERICAN FAMILY 50, 199 (2014) [hereinafter CARBONE & CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS]
(arguing that falling marriage rates are influenced by economic inequality); June Carbone & Naomi
Cahn, Is Marriage for Rich Men?, 13 NEV. L.J. 386, 403–06 (2013) (connecting economic inequality
to family instability and the prospects of marriage); Nancy Leong, Is Marriage for Rich People? A
Book Review of Ralph Richard Banks’s Is Marriage for White People?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1325, 1336
(2012) (“Of course, the factors explaining the trend toward income inequality are many and complex,
but it is clear that marriage insularity with respect to class exacerbates rather than alleviates the
problem.”); infra section III.A (discussing the existing scholarly approaches to the connection
between wealth holding and marital status).
14. See, e.g., CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS xii (2014) (exploring how “structural family law”—from employment discrimination
to zoning laws—impacts families’ lives); Maxine Eichner, The Family, in Context, 128 HARV. L. REV
1980, 1981 (2015) (book review) (describing a new trend in family law scholarship “[f]ueled by the
recognition that families are social institutions profoundly affected by their social and economic
contexts”).
15. This Article uses the term “family law” broadly to treat what Janet Halley and Kerry Rittich
call “Family Law 1, 2, 3, and 4”—laws and norms, outside the traditional realm of family law, that
explicitly or implicitly govern the laws of the household. See Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical
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impact of rules and norms of various fields on households and
relationships. For example, it considers tax law, trusts and estates, and
norms of privatizations of support, as well as physical and economic
structures that affect the ways individuals sort their potential intimate
partners.
An interdisciplinary examination of the family wealth gap
demonstrates that marriage is not an effective redistributive tool for
wealth concentrated at the top.16 Focusing on wealth at the apex of wealth
ownership reveals that marriage is a means for concentration of wealth,
assisting those who are already well-off in consolidating and maximizing
their wealth holding. The wealth-related benefits that are attendant to
marriage are helpful only to those who already own significant assets;
they do not assist married couples who are not at the top of the wealth
distribution. Therefore, attaching wealth benefits to marriage cannot be
justified as part of a policy of incentivizing non-affluent married couples
to get married.
Are policies that help wealthy married couples to accumulate wealth
justified? The theory is that marriage has the potential to reduce wealth
inequalities by fragmenting inheritance over generations, if people from
different wealth-holding quantiles marry in significant numbers.17 But, as
sociological data unequivocally demonstrate, the trend in the United
States is toward positive assortative mating; that is, people typically marry
partners with socioeconomic and educational backgrounds similar to their

Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law
Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 761 (2010). This approach is grounded in dismantling the
exceptionalism of family law. It opposes the views that treat family as the opposite of the market (i.e.,
those views that treat the family as based on notions of altruism and status and not on selfishness and
contracts—the latter being traditionally construed as describing the market).
16. Only a few commentators expressly discuss—typically on a theoretical level—the idea of
marriage as a redistributive tool. The more traditional and common account is that marriage is a tool
to fight poverty. See, e.g., ISABEL V. SAWHILL, GENERATION UNBOUND: DRIFTING INTO SEX AND
PARENTHOOD WITHOUT MARRIAGE 5–12 (2014); W. Bradford Wilcox & Robert I. Lerman, For
Richer, for Poorer: How Family Structures Economic Success in America, AM. ENTER. INST. (Oct.
28, 2014), http://www.aei.org/publication/for-richer-for-poorer-how-family-structures-economicsuccess-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/Q6VB-C8YX]; Ari Fleischer, How to Fight Income Inequality:
Get
Married,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Jan.
12,
2014,
6:07
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304325004579296752404877612
[https://perma.cc/4LCR-8TC9] (“If President Obama wants to reduce income inequality, he should
focus less on redistributing income and more on fighting a major cause of modern poverty: the
breakdown of the family.”). The question of marriage as a policy tool to combat poverty is not what
this Article explores. The Article does tackle the question of marriage’s potential role in fighting (and
contributing to) wealth concentration, but it concludes that the state should not rely on marriage to do
the job of combating the marital wealth gap. See infra sections III.D.2 & IV.B.
17. See infra section IV.B (discussing the role of marriage in breaking up family fortunes).
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own.18 Thus, in the United States, quite frequently wealth marries
wealth.19 As this marriage pattern concentrates wealth, assortative mating
further explains how marriage profits the more affluent by increasing the
wealth owned via marriage.
How should the state respond to the role marriage serves in
concentrating wealth? This Article proposes a fundamental shift in state
and federal policies concerning wealth benefits and marital status,
enabling the state to reduce marriage’s role as a wealth aggregator. It
argues that if marriage is already the preserve of the well-off, then the
state should decouple wealth benefits from marriage. This approach is
grounded in adoption of “transformative” remedies, which are designed
to recognize diverse family types (not just marital households) while also
combating the structures that enable wealth concentration among affluent
married couples.20 This framework would help dismantle the architecture
that supports the marital wealth gap.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I outlines the growth of wealth
inequality in the United States and identifies its harms. It also suggests
that family law scholarship’s focus on wealth distribution at the time of
divorce should expand to evaluating the role of marriage in economic
inequality in society generally. Part II propounds data on the correlation
between family structure and wealth ownership to demonstrate the marital
wealth gap. Part III critiques the argument that marital behavior, alone or
even primarily, explains the marital wealth gap and shows that various
other factors, including intergenerational transfers, are significant in
producing wealth inequality. Section III.C then identifies and produces a
taxonomy of the ways the law contributes to wealth concentration within
married households at the top of the wealth distribution. Section III.D
asserts that class-based marriage patterns further explain the marital
wealth gap and contribute to wealth inequality. This section contends that
individuals’ decisions to marry someone with similar socioeconomic
backgrounds is frequently informed by our society’s increased
socioeconomic segregation. Part IV advocates a pioneering shift in the
way the state treats wealth and family status. It advances a theory
grounded in transformative “recognition and redistribution” that
decentralizes marriage’s monopoly on wealth-related benefits. It also
18. See infra section III.D.1 (providing and analyzing data about patterns of assortative mating).
19. See id.
20. I build on the work of Nancy Fraser, who distinguishes between “recognition” and
“redistribution” claims and between “affirmative” and “transformative” remedies. See Nancy Fraser,
From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a “Post-Socialist” Age, 212 NEW LEFT
REV. 68, 70–74 (1995).
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argues that such strategies should simultaneously aim to reduce wealth
concentration among the richest households.
I.

INEQUALITY: A LOOK AT WEALTH VS. INCOME

In recent years, wealth inequality in the United States has been
impelled to the center of scholarly and public debate.21 At the heart of this
discussion is the fact that, compared with analogous nations, the United
States exhibits extreme wealth inequality,22 which has grown
tremendously since the late 1970s.23
To understand the discussion, one first needs to distinguish between
wealth and income. “Wealth” refers to the market value of all the assets
owned by households minus their liabilities (debt).24 “Income,” on the
other hand, is the “flow of financial resources”25 and is derived mainly
from wages, interest or investment in capital, or government transfer
payments.26 The two, of course, are connected—income affords the
buying of capital, and capital produces income—but they are not the
same.27 People generally do not use their wealth for everyday living
expenses (though they may use the income that capital yields for that
purpose), but they do use income for necessities and in the course of their

21. See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., 2014); David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626 (2014); Edward
J. McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously (USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 16–10, 2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2738848
[https://perma.cc/8WU8-X5BP].
Senator Bernie Sanders called attention to wealth inequality when he stated that “since the mid-1980s
there has been an enormous transfer of wealth from the middle class and the poor to the wealthiest
people in this country. That is the Robin Hood principle in reverse.” Income and Wealth Inequality,
BERNIE, https://berniesanders.com/issues/income-and-wealth-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/Q4DPH8DG].
22. See, e.g., MARIKO LIN CHANG, SHORTCHANGED: WHY WOMEN HAVE LESS WEALTH AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 6 (2010).
23. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913:
Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q. J. OF ECON. 519, 523 (2016).
24. Id. at 525. Assets include all the nonfinancial and financial resources that provide economic
benefits to their owners, such as property, cars, savings, retirement accounts, bonds, and stocks. Id.;
see also LARS OSBERG, ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1984) (wealth is “the total
extent, at a point in time, of an individual’s access to resources”).
25. LISA A. KEISTER, WEALTH IN AMERICA: TRENDS IN WEALTH INEQUALITY 6 (2000) (emphasis
in original).
26. OSBERG, supra note 24, at 10; see also McCaffery, supra note 21, at 7–8.
27. Further, income inequality and wealth inequality are related; due to large gaps in salaries, the
top earners can buy more capital and still keep their existing capital. At the same time, some people
who own significant wealth lack high income. For instance, retired persons often have homes or
retirement plans, but their income is quite limited. See CHANG, supra note 22, at 5.
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everyday lives.28
Wealth is a better indicator of financial status than income because it
measures the total economic resources that are available to its holder.29
Income alone is not an accurate indicator of wealth holdings for the reason
that a relatively weak correlation exists between income level and wealth
ownership.30 Estimates from survey data during the 1980s suggested that
the correlation between income and wealth was about 0.50; after
removing income that derives from assets, the correlation fell to 0.26. 31
As the economic gap in the United States widens, however, the correlation
between income and wealth is getting stronger.32
The case of women who have never married, and who work full time,
demonstrates how income is an insufficient indicator of economic status.
According to the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances, the median income
of never-married women was $34,518, while the median income of nevermarried men working full time was $35,429, which means that women
earned 97% as much income as their male counterparts.33 Thus, relying
on income alone, it seems like women almost closed the economic gap
between men and women. However, never-married women working full
time held about one-third of the wealth of never-married men working full
time. Specifically, women in this group only had a median net worth of
$6,750, while their male counterparts had a median net worth of
$18,500.34 If income were our only lens, we would incorrectly assume that
the financial situation of never-married women was quite similar to that
of their male counterparts.35

28. KEISTER, supra note 25, at 6.
29. See CHANG, supra note 22, at 4.
30. Lisa A. Keister & Stephanie Moller, Wealth Inequality in the United States, 26 ANN. REV. OF
SOC. 63, 65 (2000).
31. Id. at 65.
32. RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS: HOW THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE CLASS IS
LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE DUST, WHY THAT IS A PROBLEM, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 25
(2017) (“In fact, the link between income and wealth is strengthening over time.”).
33. MARIKO CHANG, ASSET FUNDERS NETWORK, WOMEN AND WEALTH: INSIGHTS FOR
GRANTMAKERS
9
(2015),
http://www.marikochang.com/AFN_Women_and_Wealth_Brief_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PED-Q5XT].
34. Id.
35. For scholarly discussion of the “gender wealth gap,” its causes and possible policies for remedy,
see WOMEN AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (Carmen Diana Deere & Cheryl R. Doss eds.,
2007); CHANG, supra note 22; Alyssa Schneebaum et al., The Gender Wealth Gap Across European
Countries, REV. OF INCOME AND WEALTH (2017); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Postpartum
Taxation and the Squeezed Out Mom, 105 Geo. L.J. 1323, 1327–28 (2017) (asserting that mothers
who try to reenter workforce after maternity leave see reductions in retirement savings and other
benefits).
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Additionally, it is important to consider wealth because wealth has
some benefits that income does not. Wealth can be transferred to the next
generation or sold to others (unlike employment).36 It can also generate
supplemental income, be used as collateral for loans with better tax
conditions, serve as a cushion in times of emergency and unemployment,
and provide flexibility in working patterns (one can generally rely more
on the income from assets than from labor earnings). In short, wealth
produces more wealth,37 especially because income from capital is taxed
more favorably than income from labor.38
Finally, discussing wealth is important because, in the words of Lisa A.
Keister, “while disparities in income and educational attainment are
extreme, disparities in the ownership of wealth are likely worse and
apparently more enduring across generations.”39 Likewise, a recent
OECD report that examined wealth inequality among eighteen countries
concluded that “household wealth is much more concentrated than
household income.”40
Indeed, the wealth gap in the United States has reached ominous
dimensions. The worrisome aspect of the gap, and the one that public
debate is most focused on, is the concentration of wealth among the top
1% of wealth holders.41 In 2016, the top 1% owned 38.6% of the wealth
in the United States, the highest proportion in almost a century.42 Further,
36. CHANG, supra note 22, at 4.
37. See OSBERG, supra note 24, at 198; Mariko Lin Chang, Women & Wealth, in WEALTH
ACCUMULATION AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR IN THE UNITED STATES 112 (Jessica Gordon
Nembhard & Ngina Chiteji eds., 2006); Palma Joy Strand, Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, Race, and
the Laws of Succession, 89 OR. L. REV. 453, 458 (2010).
38. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1(h) (2012) (establishing preferential tax rates applicable to capital gain
income).
39. KEISTER supra note 25, at 3–4; see also Michael Hiltzik, U.S. Income Is Bad, but Wealth
Inequality Is a Bigger Problem, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2014, 3:23 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-us-income-inequality-is-bad-20141024column.html [https://perma.cc/6B4H-8FP8]; Christopher Ingraham, If You Thought Income
Inequality Was Bad, Get a Load of Wealth Inequality, WASH. POST (May 21, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/05/21/the-top-10-of-americans-own-76-ofthe-stuff-and-its-dragging-our-economy-down [https://perma.cc/23DE-56WG].
40. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., IN IT TOGETHER: WHY LESS INEQUALITY BENEFITS
ALL 274 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264235120-en [https://perma.cc/TBR3-C7VF]; see
also PIKETTY, supra note 21, at 244 (“The distribution of capital ownership (and of income from
capital) is always more concentrated than the distribution of income from labor.”).
41. See, e.g., REEVES, supra note 32, at 22 (stating that the debate about the top 1% is “especially
salient” recently).
42. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013
to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 103 FED. RES. BULL. 3, 10–11 (2017)
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/scf17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KLN-Y959]; Wealth
Inequality in the United States, INEQUALITY.ORG, https://inequality.org/facts/wealth-inequality/
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according to one estimate, in two to three more decades the top 1% will
eventually hold roughly 50% of the wealth in the United States.43 The
amassment of wealth becomes even more extreme in regard to the top
one-tenth of 1% of Americans. This fraction owns almost as much wealth
as the bottom 90%.44 The group is composed of approximately 160,000
families; in 2012, their net assets on average per family were estimated at
$20 million or more.45
Contrary to popular belief, the parameters of the wealth inequality
problem extend beyond wealth concentration among the top 1%.
Increasingly, the top 10% of wealth holders, as well, contribute to the
growing wealth inequality in the United States.46 In 2013, the
Congressional Budget Office found that households in the ninetieth
percentile of wealth held an average of $942,000 in wealth.47 Households
in the ninety-fifth percentile held an average of $1,872,000.48 The wealth
owned by the top 10% of households increased from 67% in 1983 to 75%

[https://perma.cc/UJ8Z-Q4RC] (“Over the past century, the share of America’s wealth held by the
nation’s wealthiest has changed markedly. That share peaked in the late 1920s, right before the Great
Depression, then fell by more than half over the next three decades. But the equalizing trends of the
mid 20th century have now been almost completely undone.”). Another recent article by Edward N.
Wolff documented that in 2016 the top 1% held 39.6% of the country’s wealth. Edward N. Wolff,
Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962 to 2016: Has Middle Class Wealth Recovered?
44 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24085, 2017),
http://papers.nber.org/tmp/7707-w24085.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CD8-782N].
43. Baris Kaymak & Marcus Poschke, The Evolution of Wealth Inequality Over Half a Century:
The Role of Taxes, Transfers, and Technology, 77 J. MONETARY ECON. 1, 19 (2016).
44. McCaffery, supra note 21, at 1.
45. Saez & Zucman, supra note 23, at 521.
46. Different commentators suggest different ways to characterize the group that generates
economic inequality. Richard Reeves, for instance, insists that we should think in terms of the “upper
middle class,” which comprises the top 20% of income earners in the United States and pulls away
from the rest of society. Others suggest that we should look at the top 5% of wealth holders, or focus
only on the top 1%. See REEVES, supra note 32, at 19–20 (surveying a few of the main approaches to
characterize the class divide). My focus on those who fall within the top 10% of wealth distribution
is due to the fact that this group holds disproportional wealth compared with other groups. “In 2013,
families in the top 10 percent of the wealth distribution held 76 percent of all family wealth” while
“families in the 51st to the 90th percentiles held 23 percent.” CONG. BUDGET OFF., TRENDS IN FAMILY
WEALTH, 1989 TO 2013, 1 (2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-20152016/reports/51846-familywealth.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD5B-FS2C]. Thus, it seems justified to
hold the line at 10%.
47. CONG. BUDGET OFF., TRENDS IN FAMILY WEALTH, 1989 TO 2013, SUPPLEMENTAL DATA &
DATA
UNDERLYING
THE
EXHIBITS
AND
FIGURE
(2016),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51846supplementaldata.xlsx [https://perma.cc/25EP-3AN2] (using data primarily from the Survey of
Consumer Finances).
48. Id.
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in 2013.49
The amassment of wealth at the top correlates with erosion of wealth
in the middle class and the groups below.50 Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel
Zucman define the “middle class” as families in the top 50–90% of wealth
holders; notably, the bottom 50% own close to zero net wealth.51 While
middle-class Americans held 35% of the wealth in the United States in the
mid-1980s, they held only 23% in 2012.52 Quite astonishingly, the middle
class presently possesses more or less the same proportion of wealth that
it held seven decades ago.53 In 2013, households at the twenty-fifth
percentile or below had an average of $13,000 in debt.54 The bottom line
is that the top 1%, together with the next 9%, holds around three-quarters
of the wealth in the United States, leaving around 25% of net worth with
the remaining households.55
The uneven concentration at the top end of wealth distribution has a
profoundly adverse effect on society. Much ink has been spilled over the
question of whether economic inequality is, in and of itself, unjust.56 That
question is beyond the scope of this Article. Its potential moral problems
aside, wealth inequality has palpably injurious effects to society and to
individuals. Wealth inequality makes communities more polarized and
segregated, geographically and culturally.57 This is not a problem
implicating solely the uber-rich but one that involves affluent families in
general. The increasing class-segregation of neighborhoods provides
these families more access to social capital, schools, and education.58 This
geographical segregation can lead to less investment in public services, as
49. See Kaymak & Poschke, supra note 43, at 1.
50. Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality, PATHWAYS: STATE OF THE UNION—THE POVERTY AND
INEQUALITY REPORT 2016, 39, 42 (2016), http://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/PathwaysSOTU-2016-Wealth-Inequality-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD9C-GLJ6].
51. Saez & Zucman, supra note 23, at 554–55.
52. Id. at 523.
53. Id. at 555.
54. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 46, at 1.
55. Keister, The One Percent, supra note 3, at 353.
56. See OSBERG, supra note 24, at 3 (1984) (explaining that “[m]ost people’s interest in the extent
and causes of inequality stems, however, from the value which they place in ‘equality’”); Ann E.
Cudd, Economic Inequality and Global Justice, in ECONOMIC JUSTICE: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 159, 160–61 (Helen M. Stacy & Win Chiat Lee eds., 2013) (arguing that “[e]conomic
inequality is not necessarily unjust” but that “great inequalities in wealth can define power relations
in a society that are problematic for justice”).
57. CHUCK COLLINS, 99 TO 1: HOW WEALTH INEQUALITY IS WRECKING THE WORLD AND WHAT
WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 61–62 (2012).
58. See REEVES, supra note 32, at 31 (“The clustering of upper middle-class families into certain
neighborhoods deepens the class divide.”).
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the rich create and use a separate system of services.59
Additional adverse effects of wealth inequality are well documented.
Wealth inequality can aggregate political power in the hands of a few,
thus distorting the preference of the majority by influencing elections and
other political processes.60 This, in turn, can result in less participation and
representation of others in the political system. Again, while public
discussions often attribute this harm to the top 1%, it is also true that those
who belong to the top 10% have significant political power that helps
them set policies that benefit them the most.61 Moreover, wide gaps in
wealth concentration might also limit economic growth, as the lesswealthy live mainly from their incomes and are unable to produce more
wealth. Wealth inequality thus contributes to increased debt and less
economic activity and spending.62 At the same time, wealth concentration
generates income from capital to the wealthiest and, thus, increases
income inequality.63
There are some indications that extreme financial inequalities also lead
to more crime because people at the “losing end” of such inequalities may
not have other ways to support themselves except through criminal acts,
or may resort to crime because they feel they have been treated unfairly.64
Finally, wide gaps in wealth holding contradict the idea of a society
grounded in meritocracy—where people advance based on individual
merit and not by the situation they were born into—because
overconcentration makes social mobility and equal opportunity more
confined.65 The privilege that wealth provides is relevant, in varying
degrees, to all those from advantaged wealthy backgrounds because even

59. COLLINS, supra note 57, at 63–65.
60. See, e.g., REEVES, supra note 32, at 8 (“An individual billionaire can have a disproportionate
influence on an individual politician . . . .”); Cudd, supra note 56, at 165 (“There is another source of
unfairness leading to economic inequality, and that is inequality that is perpetuated or magnified by
the rich who are able to rig the laws that determine what count as property rights and legitimate
transactions in their favor.”).
61. Cf. REEVES, supra note 32, at 8 (“But the upper middle class has outsized political power,
too.”).
62. COLLINS, supra note 57, at 65–67.
63. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note 40, at 36.
64. STEVEN PRESSMAN, UNDERSTANDING PIKETTY’S CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 36–
37 (2016).
65. Id. at 62–63; JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY 106–46
(1983) (discussing equal opportunity from a political theory point of view); HEATHER BETH JOHNSON,
THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE POWER OF WEALTH 9–10 (2006) (discussing the dominance of
meritocracy in U.S. culture and politics); Benjamin Means, Wealth Inequality and Family Businesses,
65 Emory L.J. 937, 943 (2016) (“Wealth inequality is disturbing, not only because of its magnitude
but also because it often reflects family background more than individual merit.”).

The Marital Wealth Gap final

2018]

3/11/2018 12:11 PM

THE MARITAL WEALTH GAP

113

a small inheritance can make a large difference in life chances and in
opportunities to accrue more wealth.66
Although this Article focuses on the concentration of wealth at the top
and does not deal with the poverty side of wealth inequality, the impact
of the wealth gap on the poor must be recognized. The lack of wealth for
most of the population raises a host of societal and moral problems related
to poverty.67 The impact of wealth inequality on the poor and working
class is particularly pertinent in the United States due to the relatively thin
safety net the state provides.68 Savings are especially important in periods
of unemployment, retirement, medical emergencies, and care for children.
But the high cost of caregiving and healthcare—given the absence of
inexpensive universal healthcare, subsidized paternity leave, or statesupported childcare—makes wealth more important in the United States
than in other countries where the state provides a more generous safety
net.69 Savings are also essential in the United States due to the rising costs
of higher education.70
Wealth inequality also correlates with racial inequality.71 Based on the
2013 Survey of Consumer Finances, a Pew research report found that, in
2013, the median wealth of a white family was $141,900, while for
African American households it was $11,000, and for Hispanic

66. See Stephen J. McNamee & Robert K. Miller, Inheritance and Stratification, in INHERITANCE
K. Miller, Jr. & Stephen J. McNamee eds., 1998) (“This
applies not just to the top 1 percent . . . but in varying degrees to all those from relatively privileged
backgrounds.”).
67. See, e.g., Cudd, supra note 56, at 160 (discussing the connections between poverty and
economic inequality).
68. See Karen Jusko, Safety Net, PATHWAYS: STATE OF THE UNION—THE POVERTY AND
INEQUALITY REPORT 2016, 25, 25–31 (2016) (“The overall amount of poverty relief [in the U.S.] is
the lowest among the 13 countries in our analysis; the baseline level of support is the fourth lowest
among our countries; and the rate of relief falloff is just slightly above the median level.”).
69. Melissa Murray, Black Marriage, White People, Red Herrings, 111 MICH. L. REV. 977, 996
(2013) (“The European safety nets help contextualize the thin level of public support for American
families.”).
70. See, e.g., Grey Gordon & Aaron Hedlund, Accounting for the Rise in College Tuition (Ctr. for
Applied Econ. and Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2013-013 (2015),
http://www.iub.edu/~caepr/RePEc/PDF/2015/CAEPR2015-015.pdf [https://perma.cc/A95B-27HG]
(“From 1987 to 2010, sticker price tuition and fees [for college] ballooned from $6,600 to $14,500 in
2010 dollars. After subtracting institutional aid, net tuition and fees still grew by 78%, from $5,790
to $10,290.”).
71. It is difficult to generalize about the wealth-holding status of Asian Americans because of the
wide disparities between ethnic groups within that community. Data are quite limited about intragroup
inequality. See Paul Ong & R. Varisa Patraporn, Asian Americans and Wealth, in WEALTH
ACCUMULATION AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR IN THE UNITED STATES 173, 174–76 (Jessica Gordon
Nembhard & Ngina Chiteji eds., 2006).
AND WEALTH IN AMERICA 193, 194 (Robert
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households, $13,700.72 The Census Bureau reported that African
American households’ overall median net worth decreased by $3,746
between 2000 and 2011.73 Similarly, “[t]he overall median net worth of
Hispanic[] [households] decreased by $5,576 . . . between 2000 and
2011.”74 Because primary data include only a small representation of
Native Americans, information about wealth holding for this group is
quite limited.75 However, the data from the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth of 1979 (NLSY) show that Native Americans lag significantly
behind all other groups in wealth holding.76
Although the subject of wealth inequality has recently become
commonplace in academic literature and popular debate,77 scholarship in
the area of domestic relations has not probed the connection between laws
of adult relationships and the concentration of wealth among the richest
families. In the past two decades, scholars often critiqued the separation
between welfare law and family law, maintaining that family law is more
preoccupied with middle-class families and neglects laws pertaining to
low-income families.78 Nevertheless, the current era of family law
scholarship has produced tremendously important and thoughtful work on
the complex modes in which family law interacts with economic
inequality.79 Such research primarily examines the impact of economic
structures on the family unit and the connections between family law and
72. Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic Lines
Since
End of
Great
Recession,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec.
12, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/
[https://perma.cc/2WGL-VZJ3].
Indeed, part of the platform of Black Lives Matter includes a call for fairer taxation of wealth. See
Anja Ruddiger, Cathy Albisa, & Karl Kumodzi, A Progressive Restructuring of All Tax Codes at the
Local, State, and Federal Levels to Ensure a Radical and Sustainable Distribution of Wealth,
http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/blm.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQM3-2FJM].
73. MARINA VORNOVITSKY, ALFRED GOTTSCHALCK, & ADAM SMITH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD WEALTH IN THE U.S.: 2000 TO 2011, 4 (2011),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2011/demo/wealthdistribution-2000-to-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK37-8G27].
74. Id.
75. Jay L. Zagorsky, Native Americans’ Wealth, in WEALTH ACCUMULATION AND COMMUNITIES
OF COLOR IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 37, at 133, 134–35.
76. For instance, 25% of Native Americans in 2000 had zero wealth holding or had debt, compared
with 10% of their counterparts with such level of debt (comparison is between baby boomers in the
year 2000). Id. at 140.
77. See, e.g., Zucman, supra note 50, at 39 (“With the takeoff in income inequality by now wellknown, attention has shifted of late to trends in wealth inequality.”).
78. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 892 (2004)
(“The family law governing the poor is also excluded from the family law canon.”).
79. See, e.g., CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 13.
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poverty.80 However, this strand of work does not investigate how family
law supports affluent families in ways that result in structural economic
inequalities. Nor does it explore the means by which the family, as an
economic unit, generates economic inequality. What family law has not
explored is, then, left to tax law scholarship.
The main discussion on the intersection of wealth and family law has
focused on the “gender wealth gap”—the ways that rules about division
of property after breakup operate to the detriment of women as the main
caregivers in the family.81 However, outside the context of divorce,
scholars have rarely analyzed how certain laws affecting the family as an
economic unit interconnect with the wealth gap. One notable exception is
Benjamin Means’s recent work on the relationship between family
businesses and wealth inequality.82 Some of this lacuna in the family law
literature has been occupied by critical tax scholarship documenting how
the tax code unfavorably treats some types of families, especially those
with dual equal earners, racial minorities, and low-income
breadwinners.83 This strand of scholarship examines the issue through the
lens of taxation but does not directly address other aspects that affect the
wealth accumulation of households outside questions relating to tax. The
gap that this Article thus attempts to fill concerns the larger project of
economic inequality and the way in which family status—and marriage in
particular—preserves wealth, and the problems the marital wealth gap
creates.
80. See, e.g., id. at 406 (“While high-status men will still marry more than low-status men, the highstatus men are less likely to be married in cities with higher-income inequality than comparable men
elsewhere.”).
81. See, e.g., Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 317, 340,
345–47 (2016); Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1271–72 (2015)
(arguing that current rules pertaining to division of property upon divorce—and, particularly, division
of professional assets—do not reflect the marital bargain, and they primarily harm the main caregiver
in the relationship).
82. Means, supra note 65, at 940 (arguing that, “[o]n the one hand, family businesses can entrench
existing disparities in wealth and opportunity. . . . On the other hand, family businesses can be a
powerful antidote to inequality”).
83. See, e.g., Lily Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales, 65 ALA. L. REV. 187,
231 (2013) (“The gender and race dimensions of wealth inequality in the United States are
indisputable and deeply troubling. Women of all races are less wealthy than men, and the wealth
disparity is particularly acute for single women of color.”); Lily Kahng, The Not-So-Merry Wives of
Windsor: The Taxation of Women in Same-Sex Marriages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 328 (2016)
(arguing “that women in same-sex marriages will be less likely than other married people to enjoy
significant marriage tax benefits, and more likely to incur substantial marriage tax burdens”); Edward
J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40
UCLA L. REV. 983, 987 (1993); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family:
Uncle Sam and the Childcare Squeeze, 114 MICH. L. REV. 559, 560–63 (2016); Nancy C.
Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1573 (1996).
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To summarize, wealth is an important indicator of one’s economic
position. Wealth inequality in the United States is growing rapidly and
consistently, but the connections between wealth inequality and family
status are mostly underexplored. The next Part reviews the empirical data
about family status and wealth holding.
II.

THE MARITAL WEALTH GAP

The marital wealth gap is captured by and illustrated through four sets
of data. First, the Article examines the median wealth of married
households compared with other households. Second, looking beyond the
median, it reviews the connection between wealth holding and families at
the apex of wealth ownership. Accordingly, the Article finds that
households at the top 10% of wealth ownership are more likely to be
married than any other group. Third, some data support the claim that even
among the wealthiest taxpayers, married couples hold, on average,
significantly more wealth than single individuals and unmarried couples.
Fourth, the portfolio of investments held by married couples in general is
more diversified than other families’.
Wealth ownership and family structure are highly correlated.84 Data
consistently show a ranking wherein married families own the most,
followed by widowed, divorced, and, last, never-married individuals.85 Of
course, marriage merges the assets of couples (in terms of measuring their
net wealth), so they have more wealth than a single individual.
Nonetheless, as the data show, the wealth of married couples is often

84. Keister & Moller, supra note 30, at 73.
85. See, e.g., LISA A. KEISTER, GETTING RICH: AMERICA’S NEW RICH AND HOW THEY GOT THAT
WAY 210–11, tbl.8.1 (2005) (“Marriage behavior affects wealth in important ways that are well
documented but seldom discussed in detail. This is unfortunate because there are relationships
between marriage, divorce, widowhood, and wealth that are fundamental to understand the
accumulation of wealth of assets and wealth mobility.”); cf. Keister & Moller, supra note 30, at 73
(noting that “[f]amily structure also plays an important role in creating and maintaining differences
in wealth ownership” and that “there is evidence that marriage and widowhood increase wealth
ownership, while increased family size and family dissolution through divorce or separation have the
opposite effect” (citation omitted)). The data this Part provides concern households with opposite-sex
couples because, for the most part, the data are from years in which same-sex couples were not able
to get married in the United States. Generally, the data about wealth holding by married and unmarried
same-sex couples are nascent at this point. However, some indications are that married same-sex
couples lag behind their opposite-sex counterparts in terms of wealth ownership. For example,
according to data from the United States Census Bureau from 2014, 66.9% of married, same-sexcouple households owned homes, compared with 79.1% of their opposite-sex counterparts. Further,
68.3% of male-male married couples owned homes, compared with 65.5% of female-female married
couples. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS OF OPPOSITE-SEX AND SAMESEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS: ACS 2014 tbl.1 (2014).
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significantly greater than just double that of two single individuals.86
Based on the NLSY 1979, noted above, which examines wealth
ownership of adults born between 1957 and 1964,87 Alexis Yamokoski
and Lisa Keister estimated that, in 2000, married adults had a median net
worth of nearly $100,000, about seven and a half times the median net
worth for all single adults reported on in these data.88
After married couples, the wealthiest families are those in which one
spouse has predeceased the other. Here, the wealth gap between men
(widowers) and women (widows) is quite significant. For widowers, the
median wealth was $125,000, while, for widows, it was $73,400—
meaning that widows held only 59% of the wealth that widowers held.89
The 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances data demonstrate an even
wider gap between divorced and married households. Households with
married couples (of all ages) owned a median wealth of $148,700, while
divorced men owned a median wealth of $44,000, and divorced women,
$19,380.90 Hence, the combined median wealth of the two households of
divorced couples is approximately $64,000, which means that the median
wealth of a divorced household is around 43% that of a married
household.
Most relevant to this Article is the wealth gap between cohabiting
(unmarried) couples and married couples. Based on data from multiple
panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Alicia Eads
and Laura Tach found that married couples own significantly more wealth

86. F. Thomas Juster, James P. Smith & Frank Stafford, The Measurement and Structure of
Household Wealth, 6 LAB. ECON. 253, 263–64 (1999) (“Most directly, marriage combines the
separate assets of men and women into a single unit so that, on average, married households will have
twice the wealth of single households. But differences by marriage are much greater than that with
married couples typically having three and one-half times as much wealth as nonmarried
households.”).
87. The NLSY 1979 followed these adults annually from 1979 to 1994 and every other year since
then. National Longitudinal Survey, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://www.bls.gov/nls/y79summary.htm [https://perma.cc/5VTZ-J4ZX] (last updated June 25,
2003). It followed the same group of people to sketch their development through the years. Id. Starting
from 1985, when the respondents reached the age of 20, the survey has also collected data about
wealth holding. See Lisa A. Keister & E. Paige Borelli, Religion and Wealth Mobility: The Case of
American Latinos, in RELIGION AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA: RESEARCH AND THEORY ON
RELIGION’S ROLE IN STRATIFICATION 119, 126 (Lisa A. Keister & Darren E. Sherkat eds., 2014). In
terms of measuring wealth inequality, it is an ideal scale because it tracks the wealth holding of the
same group of people at different points in time. See id.
88. Alexis Yamokoski & Lisa A. Keister, The Wealth of Single Women: Marital Status and
Parenthood in the Asset Accumulation of Young Baby Boomers in the United States, 12 FEMINIST
ECON. 167, 178 (2006).
89. Chang, supra note 37, at 115.
90. Id.
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than their unmarried counterparts.91 According to their data, which
concerned couples’ wealth holding from 1996 to 2013, married couples
held median net wealth of $142,000, while cohabiting couples held
median net wealth of $24,800.92
Not only are married households wealthier than all other household
structures, the top 10% of wealth holders are married in greater
proportions than other groups in the descending array of wealth holding.
Based on the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances, Keister concludes “that
members of the one percent are disproportionately male, white, and
married.”93 However, the data she relies on do not distinguish between
unmarried and married couples but simply track households headed by
couples versus single individuals. Hence, using this information, we can
only learn that households at the top 1% tend to be partnered but not
necessarily legally married. These same data (derived from the Survey of
Consumer Finances) further demonstrate that, looking at the top 1%, more
than 90% of households consist of couples; in the next 9%, almost 79%
of households are couples; and, regarding the bottom 90%, only 55% of
households consist of couples.94 This is already helpful, as it shows that
single individuals have relatively less representation among the top 1%
and the top 10% than other family types. While we do not know how many
of these couples at the apex of wealth holding are married, data about
income distribution teach that households at the top of the income
distribution generally consist of married couples more than households in
any of the other groups on this scale.95 Although wealth and income do
not always correlate, data about income of married couples serve as one
indication for the pronounced inclination toward marriage among top
wealth holders.96 That the wealthiest households in the United States
primarily consist of married couples finds further support in data about
91. Alicia Eads & Laura Tach, Wealth and Inequality in the Stability of Romantic Relationships, 2
RSF: RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 197, 205–06 (2016).
92. Id. at 206 (“The median married couple had about $68,000 in secured debt, $1,800 in unsecured
debt, and $23,000 in liquid assets and $189,000 in illiquid assets. The median cohabiting couple, by
contrast, had no secured debt, $700 in unsecured debt, $1,500 in liquid assets, and $24,000 in illiquid
assets.”).
93. Keister, The One Percent, supra note 3, at 356.
94. Id. at 357 tbl.1.
95. Cf. REEVES, supra note 32, at 28–29 (arguing that upper-middle-class individuals are more
likely to get and stay married than other economic strata of the population).
96. Christine Percheski & Christina Gibson-Davis, Family Structure & Wealth Inequality among
Families
with
Children,
1989–2013,
8,
http://www.ecineq.org/ecineq_nyc17/FILESx2017/CR2/p190.pdf [https://perma.cc/85AB-84NK]
(“Income does not translate directly into wealth. Nevertheless, parents with higher incomes are likely
to have more money that can be directed toward savings or asset accumulation.”).
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wealth holding among parents, based on family structure. According to a
recent study, in 2013, married parents in the top seventy-fifth percentile
held a median net worth of $338,500, compared with $49,440 for
cohabiting parents.97 Together, these studies offer a strong indication that
the wealthiest households are more likely than any other group to be
headed by married couples.
Another aspect of the marital wealth gap is that, even among the richest
families in the United States, married couples hold, on average,
significantly more wealth than singles and unmarried couples. Recently
released IRS data documenting charitable bequests made by decedents in
2013 provide a solid sample that supports this argument. The population
surveyed in these data, and that appear in Tables 1 and 2, consists
of decedents making charitable bequests, not all decedents leaving
estates. In 2013, this group included 2634 decedents out of 10,568 estate
tax returns from that year.98 This means that approximately one quarter of
the estates in 2013 are represented in these data, a sizeable sample, and
there is no reason to assume that the population that made charitable
contributions is different in terms of wealth holding and family status
from those populations who did not make such contributions. The data are
categorized by the sex and marital status of the decedent.99
Table 1: Wealth of Estates Bequeathed by Male Decedents (2013)

Decedent
male

Number of
estates
filed

Married
Widowed
Single

557
449
209

Total net worth
for the
category (in
billions)
16.7
9.4
2.4

Average
wealth of an
estate (in
millions)
30
21
11.4

97. Id. at app. tbl.A2.
98. SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Statistics Filing Year Table 1, IRS (Oct. 6, 2017)
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-estate-tax-statistics-filing-year-table-1
[https://perma.cc/26DK-PURF] (click link to table for 2013); SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Data, by
Year of Death, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-estate-tax-statistics-year-of-deathtable-3 [https://perma.cc/KAL9-MRY6] (click link to table for 2013).
99. See SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Data, by Year of Death, supra note 98 (click link to table for
2013).
In the original data, the amount is in thousands of dollars; I converted to billions and rounded up.
The average does not appear in the original data and average can, obviously, be affected by any single
estate that is too big or too small. I did not take into consideration the category of “other”—which
refers to marital statuses “unknown,” “divorced,” or “legally separated”—because it included too
many variations.

The Marital Wealth Gap final

120

3/11/2018 12:11 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:xxx

Table 2:
Wealth of Estates Bequeathed by Female Decedents (2013)

Decedent
female

Number of
estates
filed

Married
Widowed
Single

130
904
137

Total net worth
for the
category (in
billions)
2.5
18.9
1.3

Average
wealth of an
estate (in
millions)
19
20.9
9.8

The IRS data provide a clear illustration of this aspect of the marital
wealth gap. Married men who died in 2013 held, on average, almost three
times the wealth of a single male decedent (whether never married, or
partnered but unmarried).100 Meanwhile, at the time of death, single or
partnered but unmarried women held, on average, half the wealth of their
widowed and married counterparts.101 Hence, even among the wealthiest,
marital status provides some advantage in wealth accumulation.
Married couples are also unique in the greater diversity of their
portfolio compositions.102 This is important because a diversified portfolio
might immunize investments from sharp changes in the market. Married
couples are most likely (compared with all other household categories) to
be homeowners. According to Mariko Chang’s calculation, based on the
2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, 83% of white married couples own
their homes, with a median equity of $85,000, compared with 55% of
white single men, who own homes with a median equity of $67,000.103
100. Id. Classifying a taxpayer as “single” means that the individual is unmarried according the
relevant state law. See IRS, PUBLICATION 501: EXEMPTIONS, STANDARD DEDUCTION AND FILING
INFORMATION 6 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p501.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5GK3KT3]. In all states, partners who live together in unmarried (and nonregistered) relationships, even
long term, are not recognized as married. See, e.g., Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L.
REV. 573, 587, 591 (2013). This signifies that “single individuals” in this data might include
unmarried partners, even if they are in long-term and economically interdependent relationships.
101. See SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Data, by Year of Death, supra note 99. When it comes to
women, the large number of widowed women is explained by the fact that wives often outlive their
husbands. See Barry Johnson & Louise Woodburn, Analyzing the Weighting Strategy for the Statistics
of Income 1987 Estate Study, in STATISTICS OF INCOME AND RELATED ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
RESEARCH: 1988–1989, 97, 103 (Beth Kilss & Bettye Jamerson eds., 1990).
102. Percheski, supra note 96, at 29 (finding that married couples “had the most diverse assets
portfolio (in terms of number of assets owned), and the highest median value of assets within each
category”).
103. CHANG, supra note 22, at 82 tbl.5.7. Lisa Keister’s study, based on the (NLSY) 1979, finds
similar results: while married couples represent only 63% of respondents, 85% of them own primary
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Fifty-six percent of black married couples own their homes (median
equity, $50,000) compared with 36% of single black men (median equity,
$39,000) and 42% of black single women (median equity, $28,000).104
The same high representation of married couples is true in stock
ownership, including mutual funds and retirement accounts, where 59%
of married households own stock at a median value of $23,450. In
contrast, 45% of single males own stock (at a median value of $13,200),
and only 36% of single females own stock (at a median value of
$9,000).105
In conclusion, the data are consistent in showing a marital wealth gap:
marital households own more wealth than all other groups, across the
various types of wealth. The top 10%, and especially the top 1%, are more
likely to be married than the next 90%. And, even among the wealthiest,
married couples possess considerably more wealth than their unmarried
counterparts. The next Part investigates why this is the case.
III. MARRIAGE AS A WEALTH MAXIMIZER
This Part probes the causes of the marital wealth gap. It starts with
scrutinizing the conventional sociological account that views marriage
itself as explaining the fact that married households hold more wealth than
other types of family structures. Section B then examines how factors
related to family background (other than marital status) affect wealth
accumulation. Section C develops a taxonomy of the ways in which the
law bears some responsibility for part of the marital wealth gap by
facilitating, and even encouraging, wealthy spouses to consolidate and
maximize their wealth. Finally, section D exposes the role of class-based
assortative mating in the marital wealth gap, and delineates how the law,
primarily in its inaction, supports the conditions for these selection
practices.
A.

Does Marital Behavior Generate Wealth?

The fact that married couples own significantly more wealth than other
households may seem completely reasonable: married couples
consolidate their assets and enjoy the benefits of economies of scale.
Scholars have often embraced this account as the principal explanation for

residence, as compared to 47% of divorced women and 30% of never-married men. See KEISTER,
supra note 85, at 216 tbl.8.2 (2005).
104. CHANG, supra note 22, at 82 tbl.5.7.
105. Id. at 84 tbl.5.8.
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the marital wealth gap. As Keister explains, “Married couples typically
join assets, income is considerably higher for married couples, and
expenses tend to be lower for married couples.”106 Likewise, Linda J.
Waite and Maggie Gallagher argue that “being married in itself seems to
encourage the creation and retention of wealth.”107 While they concede,
in one remark, that “[s]ome of the advantage married people have is
undoubtedly due to selection,” they insist that the behavior of married
couples, in and of itself, explains why marriage is correlated with
increased wealth holding.108
Scholars who advance this hypothesis put forth five main reasons to
support their claim. First, married households cut expenditures as a result
of labor specialization and the support that spouses provide one another.109
For example, when one spouse cooks well, the household can save money
on restaurants; or when one spouse can do the accounting for the family
business, then the couple can save money, too. In addition, married
couples enjoy economies of scale: they divide the payment for housing
and utilities. Second, when couples marry, they promise each other to be
there for better and for worse. Such promises serve as the equivalent of
implied insurance in cases such as loss of employability or filing for
bankruptcy.110 Third, the marital framework and the social norms
associated with it lead couples to adopt financially responsible
behavior.111 Other scholars offer a somewhat comparable theory, positing
that the marital framework motivates males to be more committed to
earning an income.112 Fourth, married couples get more financial support
from in-laws and other extended family than do divorced and nonmarried
couples, who receive much less economic assistance from either partner’s
family.113 Fifth, divorce has an adverse financial effect, as now the ex106. KEISTER, supra note 85, at 210.
107. LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE
ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 113 (2000).
108. Id. at 113, 122–23; see also W. BRADFORD WILCOX, JOSEPH PRICE, & ROBERT I. LERMAN,
STRONG
FAMILIES,
PROSPEROUS
STATES
29
(2015),
https://www.aei.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/IFS-HomeEconReport-2015-FinalWeb.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4X6GWEEC] (“[M]arried couples are more likely to accumulate wealth than singles or cohabiting couples
from similar backgrounds, even after adjusting for income. Furthermore, married parents receive
more financial support from both sets of grandparents than do cohabiting couples or single parents.”).
109. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 107, at 114–15; Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Avia Spivak,
The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market, 89 J. POL. ECON. 372, 372 (1981).
110. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 107, at 115–16.
111. Id.at 116–17.
112. WILCOX, PRICE, & LERMAN, supra note 108, at 28.
113. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 107, at 127–28; see also WILCOX, PRICE, & LERMAN, supra
note 108, at 29 (“Furthermore, married parents receive more financial support from both sets of
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spouses must use their same income and wealth to maintain two
households instead of one.114
These accounts contain some valid observations. It is true that married
couples enjoy economies of scale, that marriage (and other strong
relationships) serves as an efficient alternative to insurance, that married
couples get more financial support from their families, and that divorce
adversely affects the finances of the family. However, these factors alone
are insufficient in accounting for the marital wealth gap.
First, the fact that married couples fare better in terms of wealth
accumulation shows correlation rather than causation: there is no proof
that marriage is the cause of greater wealth rather than merely reflecting
patterns of selection. That is, people with wealth, or with certain
characteristics that can lead to wealth accumulation, are more likely to get
married and stay married.115
In fact, wealth, or lack thereof, is often a reason that poor and
nonwealthy individuals do not get married. Sociologist Daniel Schneider
recently found that owning a financial asset increases the probability that
a man will get married by 1.5 percentage points over a man who does not
own any, and that car ownership increases the probability that a man will
get married by 2.6 percentage points.116 He further found that wealth
explains marriage patterns—including the lack of marriage—more than
education and income do.117
In addition, the argument that married couples are more committed to
saving and productivity is also problematic. Many studies have found that
the reason cohabitants do not get married is that they are concerned that
their partners are not financially responsible.118 Thus, economically
responsible behavior may indicate selection, rather than marriage’s
impact on couples’ behaviors. Further, while it is true that divorced
grandparents than do cohabiting couples or single parents.”).
114. KEISTER, supra note 25, at 222 (“Likewise when couples separate or divorce, splitting assets
eliminates the benefit of economies of scale.”); WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 107, at 130.
115. See GARY R. LEE, THE LIMITS OF MARRIAGE, WHY GETTING EVERYONE MARRIED WON’T
SOLVE ALL OUR PROBLEMS 119 (2015) (“The research literature leaves no doubt that a major reason
why married people are economically advantaged is that men with the most potential and actual
economic advantages are more likely to marry, and they bring these advantages with them into
marriage.”); Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 159
(2003) (“That married people are better off than unmarried people does not demonstrate that marriage
makes people better off. As critics of the marriage movement have long charged, correlation is not
causation.”).
116. Daniel Schneider, Wealth and the Marital Divide, 117 AM. J. SOC. 627, 658 (2011).
117. Id. at 648–49.
118. Pamela J. Smock et al., “Everything’s There Except Money”: How Money Shapes Decisions
to Marry Among Cohabitors, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 680, 686–92 (2005).
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couples have to maintain two households and, therefore, fare less well
financially than married couples, this argument also fails to acknowledge
the correlation-versus-causation problem.119 Consequently, lack of wealth
may be a reason to divorce—and it provides a more nuanced explanation
as to why married couples stay together and are wealthier.120
Second, although married couples do enjoy economies of scale, other
households can and do enjoy similar benefits.121 Unmarried couples who
live together, as well as nonconjugal partners who cohabit and are
economically and emotionally interdependent, all enjoy, to different
degrees, such advantages. Moreover, surely economies of scale cannot
explain the marital wealth gap in relation to the top 1%. Therefore,
economies of scale, alone, cannot explain the marital wealth gap.
Third, Waite and Gallagher fail to acknowledge that marriage is not
economically better for everyone, as indicated by the fact that many
married couples are poor: 46% of households with less than twice the
federal poverty-level income are married couples.122 And for African
American families, unlike white households, marriage does not
significantly elevate the family’s wealth.123 Recent census data support
the claim that for people on the lower end of the economic spectrum,
marriage does not increase wealth holding. In 2011, the median net worth
for a married couple in the lowest quintile was –$3733; for a male
householder, –$6400; and, for a female householder, –$3202.124 So,
119. A recent study found that owning significant unsecured debt (i.e., debt unsecured by collateral,
such as consumer or credit card debt)—to be distinguished from secured debt (like a mortgage)—is
associated with a reduction in marital stability. Eads & Tach, supra note 91, at 211–12; see also
Researcher Finds Correlation Between Financial Arguments, Decreased Relationship Satisfaction,
KAN.
ST.
U.
(July
12,
2013),
http://www.kstate.edu/media/newsreleases/jul13/predictingdivorce71113.html [https://perma.cc/K5BF-NAN7]
(2012 study of more than 4,500 couples indicated that financial arguments are the top predictor of
divorce).
120. In addition, starting in the 1980s, the rate of divorce has significantly fluctuated among the
less-educated while declining for the well-educated. See CARBONE & CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS,
supra note 13, at 15–16. Because wealth and education have a strong correlation, divorce can be
equally the result of the couple’s lack of financial wealth.
121. See Robert S. McIntyre & Michael J. McIntyre, Fixing the “Marriage Penalty” Problem, 33
VAL. U. L. REV. 907, 912–13 (1999) (“[M]arital partners do not necessarily enjoy above average
amounts of economies-of-scale benefits.”).
122. URBAN INST., ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM EIGHT YEARS LATER 11 (2005),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/311198-Assessing-the-NewFederalism-Eight-Years-Later.PDF [https://perma.cc/ZCJ9-KG9U].
123. THOMAS SHAPIRO, TATJANA MESCHEDE & SAM OSORO, INST. ON ASSETS & SOC. POL’Y, THE
ROOTS OF THE WIDENING RACIAL WEALTH GAP: EXPLAINING THE BLACK-WHITE ECONOMIC DIVIDE
4
(2013),
http://iasp.brandeis.edu/pdfs/Author/shapiro-thomas-m/racialwealthgapbrief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75Y3-HBYL].
124. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SURVEY OF INCOME AND PROGRAM PARTICIPATION, 2008 PANEL,
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assuming that marriage patterns are such that poor marry poor (or, more
likely, do not marry at all), the combination of such partners’ wealth could
yield more debt.125
In conclusion, marital behavior only partly explains why married
couples fare better in terms of wealth accumulation. Wealth plays a
significant role in the decision about whether to get married in the first
place and in the decision about whether to stay married.126 And, as this
Article argues in section C, the rules of family law have direct
implications for why some married couples are more successful in
acquiring and retaining wealth—another aspect that the conventional
account ignores. Similarly, Waite and Gallagher’s argument lacks any
reference to the effect of intergenerational transfers on wealth creation and
retention. The following section discusses this issue further.127
B.

Family Background Impacts Wealth Accumulation

Completely absent from Waite and Gallagher’s account presented
above is the significant role that family background apart from family
structure—such as religion, race, education, sexual orientation, and
inheritance—plays in wealth accumulation and wealth mobility. Family
background has a significant effect on households’ ability and likelihood
to create and retain wealth. This further supports this Article’s argument
that marital behavior or economies of scale tell a partial story.
Intergenerational transfers directly assist in wealth accumulation when
offspring receive an inheritance. Most studies on wealth inequality
indicate that intergenerational transfers (inter vivos and through
inheritance) account for at least 50%—and perhaps more than 80%—of
the net worth of families in the United States.128 This proportion is likely
going to grow; researchers from the Center on Wealth and Philanthropy
WAVE 10, tbl.1 (2014) https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/demo/tables/wealth/2011/wealthasset-ownership/distribution-2011.xlsx [https://perma.cc/R8SP-HUYK]
125. In such cases of poverty, it is also likely that marital status has an adverse effect on eligibility
for need-based welfare. See generally Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276,
1291 (2014) (examining cases in which legal recognition of relationships results in financial hardship
to the couple).
126. See Schneider, supra note 116, at 648–49, 658.
127. See infra section III.B.
128. Keister & Moller, supra note 30, at 72; JACQUELINE L. ANGEL, INHERITANCE IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA: THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF GIVING ACROSS GENERATIONS 4 (2008);
Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation / Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2182 n.7
(2011) (“Economic studies have found that a large fraction (possibly in the range of eighty percent)
of household wealth in the United States traces to gifts and inheritances, as opposed to participation
in the labor economy.”).
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at Boston College estimate that approximately $59 trillion of wealth will
be transferred by estates between 2007 and 2061.129
Intergenerational transfers can also assist indirectly by contributing to
investments likely to increase wealth accumulation.130 Transfers that
enable higher education and homeownership can be of particular
importance.131 Even a small inheritance—such as one used for the down
payment of a first home, typically the first investment that Americans
make—“can create a stable base for saving throughout the life course.”132
Similarly, education has a special correlation to wealth, as it improves
professional opportunities and can create social contacts that may provide
business opportunities or even financial help.133 Indeed, recent studies of
inheritance patterns show that, given longer lifespans and the rising cost
of higher education, the use of inter vivos transfers has increased.134
Middle-class Americans typically transfer cash assistance during their
lifetimes rather than transferring assets by bequest,135 suggesting that
parents’ economic status has a high predictive value for the next
generation.136 Using the data from the NLSY 1979 cohort, Keister
concludes that “inheritance has a direct effect on adult wealth.”137
The role of inheritance in perpetuating the racial wealth gap between
white families and families of color is especially pivotal, as white families
are likely to receive significantly larger inheritances.138 For instance, data
show that, among those who receive an inheritance, whites inherit about
ten times more wealth than African Americans.139 One study found that,
129. John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, A Golden Age of Philosophy Still Beckons: National
Wealth Transfer and Potential for Philanthropy (Boston College Tech. Report, 2014),
5http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/research_sites/cwp/pdf/A%20Golden%20Age%20of%20Phil
anthropy%20Still%20Bekons.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P8F-ELRK].
130. Yamokoski & Keister, supra note 88, at 174.
131. KEISTER, supra note 85, at 102.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 103.
134. Cf., e.g., AMERIPRISE FIN., MONEY ACROSS GENERATIONS II STUDY: FAMILY FIRST 5 (2012),
http://newsroom.ameriprise.com/images/20018/MAG%20Research%20Report%20Family%20First
%204-27-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/DUB3-LAW7] (finding that 71% of surveyed parents financially
assisted their children with college tuition); John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in
Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 723 (1988) (“[I]ntergenerational wealth
transmission no longer occurs primarily upon the death of the parents, but rather, when the children
are growing up . . . .”).
135. ANGEL, supra note 128, at 16–17.
136. Strand, supra note 37, at 466.
137. KEISTER, supra note 85, at 124–25.
138. Keister & Moller, supra note 30, at 76; Strand, supra note 37, at 467–68.
139. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 123, at 5.
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even controlling for such individual characteristics as level of education,
age, gender, and previous income, there are statistically significant
differences in wealth holdings between African Americans and whites.140
“Further, parental net worth (wealth)—not parental education,
occupational prestige, or income—was the variable that mattered . . . .”141
In short, wealth accumulation and retention are affected by variables
other than marital behavior, such as parental wealth, intergenerational
transfers, education, and race. The next section looks at another, more
hidden, part of the puzzle: the role that the law plays in the marital wealth
gap.
C.

The Law Confers Wealth Advantages on Affluent Married Couples

This section adds another layer of explanation for the concentration of
wealth at the top 10% by showing that the law plays a part in the marital
wealth gap. It does not assert that these legal mechanisms are the only
reason for this gap. In fact, as section B shows, various factors correlate
with wealth holding. Yet, the Article argues that marriage can function as
a wealth maximizer for those who are already well-off. It divides the laws
that support wealth concentration by married couples into three
categories: (1) laws that exacerbate underlying conditions; (2) laws that
expressly prefer married couples based on their marital status; and (3)
laws and norms that encourage married households to keep wealth within
the family.
Two caveats. First: many fringe benefits, which this Article does not
discuss, are bestowed on married couples, making their lives and finances
better than those of other households. Such boons, including health
insurance through a spouse,142 positively affect income and could
eventually have an impact on wealth accumulation.143 Here, however, the
Article focuses on rules that directly involve the wealth accumulation of
the household. Mariko Lin Chang calls such financial benefits “the wealth
escalators”—a term that represents a variety of assists that “allow people
to generate wealth at a much faster rate than can be obtained by collecting
income alone.”144 Further, the Article does not aim to document and
140. DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY
47 (10th anniversary ed. 2010).
141. Strand, supra note 37, at 469 (emphasis in original) (discussing Conley’s study).
142. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and Countermarriage, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 235, 258–59 (2011) (enumerating the rights and benefits that are attached to marriage).
143. CHANG, supra note 22, at 44 (listing fringe benefits that “are indirectly linked with the wealth
escalator”).
144. Id. at 40.
IN AMERICA
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analyze all of the benefits attendant to marriage that affect wealth but only
to give a few illustrative rules. Second, in some cases, there could be
significant financial benefits to being unmarried. One set of such benefits
is applicable particularly to lower-income households;145 other benefits,
involving rules that serve to prevent tax avoidance by family members,
can also provide financial benefit to couples in legally unrecognized
relationships.146 And there are also marriage penalties, which mainly
affect wealthy couples with equal incomes.147 While these rules could be
economically detrimental to married couples, when it comes to the family
wealth of couples in the top 10%, as explained below, the advantages
accruing to the status of “married” sometimes outweigh the
disadvantages.148
1.

Laws that Exacerbate Underlying Conditions

This first category—laws that exacerbate underlying conditions—
includes legal mechanisms that create preferences that are most profitable
to married couples. They do this not by directly singling out married
couples but, rather, by formalizing certain practices that redound to their
benefit. This category includes rules that help married couples hold onto
wealth they already have or to easily convert their income to wealth.
Capital Gains Exclusion for Sale of Principal Residence: Section 121
of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the exclusion of up to $250,000
of capital gains—$500,000 for married taxpayers—on the sale of a home
owned and used as a principal residence by the taxpayer.149 This rule
equally applies to unmarried couples who have co-owned and lived in the
145. See Aloni, supra note 125, at 1291 (discussing the financial benefits that stem from legal
nonrecognition of relationships).
146. Theodore P. Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1529, 1531 & n.2 (2008) (surveying some of the major tax rules that are designed to prevent tax
abuse among family members).
147. See Martha T. McCluskey, Razing the Citizen: Economic Inequality, Gender, and Marriage
Tax Reform, in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 267, 280–82
(Linda C. McClain & Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009).
148. Cf. Kelly A. Moore, The Curious Case of Dr. Jekyll and the Estate Tax Marital Deduction:
Should Prenuptial Agreements Alter the Relationship?, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 255, 262 (2013) (“To
be sure, the Jekyll approach is more generous than the Hyde approach is restrictive. The focus on
marriage and reliance on the economic unit presumption is firmly entrenched in the tax code.”).
Further, because married couples at the very top of wealth ownership often have only one incomeproducing spouse, they are more likely to enjoy the marriage benefit than suffer the marriage penalty
when it comes to income tax. See Katherine K. Baker, The Stories of Marriage, 12 J. L. & FAM. STUD.
1, 25–26 (2010) (“[T]he more wealth a married couple has, the more profound their gender
specialization tends to be.” (footnote omitted)).
149. I.R.C. § 121(b) (2012).
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same house in the two years prior, assuming that both partners are listed
as co-owners on the title; in such case, each can claim up to $250,000
from the gain (based on their relative shares in the home).150 But, if they
do not co-own the residency by title, they cannot enjoy the $500,000
exclusion (unlike married couples who file together).
In any event, this tax benefit favors wealthy married couples because
they are most likely to enjoy it. Data about home ownership by married
couples versus others make it possible for us to estimate the proportion of
each group seemingly able to use this tax benefit. Indeed, married couples
own about 80% of homes in the United States.151 Because unmarried
couples are significantly less likely to own homes than are married
couples—let alone more expensive properties that appreciate by
$500,000—this benefit is of limited enjoyment to them and directly
rewards wealthy married couples.152 Further, a recent report concluded
that even the $250,000 exemption is “not likely to help young, lowincome, and first-time homebuyers.”153 Other data suggest that “[s]ingle
people of color own homes at the lowest rates and with the lowest
values.”154 Thus, we can confidently presume that the double benefit, the
$500,000 exclusion, will be most beneficial to affluent married couples
who own expensive properties.155 This benefit goes to those who already
owned a home and saw a great increase in its value.156 It is not a minor
150. Robert Bruss, 1 Year Later: Home Sale Tax Exemption of $250,000/$500,000, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 17, 1998, § 4, at 2, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-10-17/news/9810170145_1_tax-freesale-profits-principal-residence-tax-exemption [https://perma.cc/HD9X-H8ZN] (“Two (or more)
[unmarried] co-owners of their principal residence can each qualify for up to $250,000 of tax-free
home sale profit. Of course, each co-owner must meet the two-out-of-the-last-five-years aggregate
ownership and occupancy requirement.”)
151. Carlos Garriga, William T. Gavin & Don Schlagenhauf, Recent Trends in Homeownership,
88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 397, 399 (2006).
152. Cf. Rachel Bogardus Drew, 3 Facts about Marriage and Homeownership, HARV. JOINT CTR.
FOR
HOUSING
STUD.:
HOUSING
PERSP.
(Dec.
17,
2014),
http://housingperspectives.blogspot.ca/2014/12/3-facts-about-marriage-and-homeownership.html
[https://perma.cc/ZT8N-JY9B] (“[M]arried couples are much more likely to be homeowners than
unmarried individuals, due to their generally better socio-economic status. Married couples are also
more likely to have children, and therefore more likely to want larger homes in areas with more
family-friendly amenities such as safe neighborhoods and good schools.”); Chang, supra note 37, at
116 (data showing that, on average, married households own more assets than other household types
and have more median capital invested in them).
153. Garriga, Gavin & Shlagenhauf, supra note 151, at 401.
154. Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales, supra note 83, at 232.
155. Cf. Phyllis C. Taite, Exploding Wealth Inequalities: Does Tax Policy Promote Social Justice
or Social Injustice?, 36 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 201, 211 (2014) (“Since most middle to lower income
taxpayers would not likely own homes that would bring these substantial gains, this subsidy is clearly
intended to benefit the wealthier taxpayers.”).
156. REEVES, supra note 32, at 105 (“The IRS is generous when we sell our expensive homes too,
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exclusion: the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation “estimated that
the exclusion provision saved homeowners $29 billion in income tax in
fiscal 2016.”157
Importantly, until 1997, the maximum exclusion amount was
$125,000, but married couples filing together were entitled only to one
exclusion between them—i.e., a total of $125,000 for both spouses.158 In
2007, Congress amended the amount per individual to $250,000 but also
changed the law so spouses can each claim $250,000—for a total of
$500,000. That is, this new rule “doubl[es] the exclusion amount for
unmarried taxpayers, and quadrupl[es] it for married couples.”159 The
history of the amendment does not explain why the benefit was increased
so much for married couples.160
The double exclusion contrasts with the way the income tax system
grants a marriage bonus to the lower tax brackets and imposes a marriage
penalty on those who earn the most.161 The income tax system eliminates
the marriage penalty for lower-earning spouses by simply doubling the
return rates that are imposed on each separately.162 Conversely, the tax
code sets the rates of upper-earning married couples as the single-earner
rate. Thus, at the 33% bracket, the cap remains the same for single returns
and for married joint returns.163 The income tax reflects the notion that
some penalty is justified when treating affluent married couples.164 But
the same assumption is not extended to the capital gains exclusion for the
sale of a principal residence; in the latter case, we simply double the
benefit, helping the rich to get richer.
Social Security Retirement Benefits: At first glance, Social Security
retirement benefits may seem to have little to no connection to the people
giving us a break from any tax on capital gains. Half the value of this tax break goes to those of us in
the top income quintile.”).
157. Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System: What Are the Tax Benefits of Homeownership?, TAX
POL’Y CTR.: BRIEFING BOOK (Jan. 7, 2018), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-aretax-benefits-homeownership [https://perma.cc/JX93-7XMU].
158. Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales, supra note 83, at 195–96.
159. Id. at 196.
160. Id. at 196 n.29 (“There is no explanation of why the exclusion amount was raised so
substantially.”).
161. Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed,
54 TAX L. REV. 1, 59 (2000).
162. Mitchell L. Engler & Edward D. Stein, Not Too Separate or Unequal: Marriage Penalty Relief
After Obergefell, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1086 (2016).
163. Id.
164. Cf. Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 612
(1995) (“Sizeable penalties on marriage were enacted for high-income taxpayers in 1993 for the sole
purpose of conforming to a specific combination of revenue and distributional targets . . . .”).
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in the top 10% of the wealth distribution. And while it is certainly the case
that the people in this group are most likely to have private retirement
accounts, Social Security still gives an advantage in wealth creation.165
People in the top 10%, including individuals in the top 1%, frequently take
their Social Security retirement benefit. President Trump once
acknowledged in an interview, “I have friends that are worth hundreds of
millions and billions of dollars and get Social Security. They don’t even
know the check comes in.”166 Manifestly, the money from Social Security
is more significant to the group in the top 10% than to those in the top 1%.
Social Security retirement funds are the most common retirement
income.167 In 2011 almost 25% of married beneficiaries, and 45% of
unmarried elderly beneficiaries age 65 and older, relied on Social Security
for at least 90% of their income.168 While marital status is ignored for the
purposes of paying Social Security (each taxpayer is taxed individually),
benefits are related to marital status, and Social Security allotments
privilege married couples in several ways.169 The data imply that highearning married couples collect their Social Security benefits: in 2010,
approximately 6% of the recipients of Social Security distributions were
married couples with an annual income of $200,000 or more.170 Only
0.4% of the beneficiaries with $200,000 or more per year were
unmarried.171
At the very basic level, a married individual, or previously married
individual (widowed or divorced, if married for more than ten years), is
eligible to receive up to 50% of a spouse’s (or ex-spouse’s) benefit

165. In fact, the connections between Social Security and wealth inequality are the subject of
extensive debate that exceeds the scope of this Article, which focuses on the marital wealth gap only.
For an argument that Social Security “exacerbates wealth inequality” see Jagadeesh Gokhale &
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, The Impact of Social Security and Other Factors on the Distribution of Wealth,
in THE DISTRIBUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 85, 101–06
(Martin Feldstein & Jeffrey B. Liebman eds., 2002).
166. Heather Haddon, Donald Trump: My Rich Friends Shouldn’t Take Social Security, WALL ST.
J.: WASH. WIRE (Oct. 12, 2015, 3:10 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/10/12/donaldtrump-my-rich-friends-shouldnt-take-social-security/ [https://perma.cc/2RKW-4YBY].
167. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-33, RETIREMENT SECURITY: TRENDS IN
MARRIAGE AND WORK PATTERNS MAY INCREASE ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY FOR SOME RETIREES
1 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660202.pdf [https://perma.cc/PPH6-B55Q].
168. Id. at 7.
169. Wendy Richards, Comment, An Analysis of Recent Tax Reforms from a Marital-Bias
Perspective: It Is Time to Oust Marriage from the Tax Code, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 611, 633 (2008).
170. Income of the Population 55 or Older, 2010, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., at tbl.3.A2,
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/income_pop55/2010/sect03.html#table3.a2
[https://perma.cc/GDY3-YNPR] (2.0% were 55–61, 1.5% 62–64, and 2.7% 65 and older).
171. Id.
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amount, based on the spouse’s contribution alone.172 That is, even if a
married, divorced, or widowed person did not work and therefore is
ineligible to receive personal Social Security retirement benefits, that
person is entitled to Social Security funds based upon the spouse’s
contribution.173 The number of recipients who receive Social Security
solely based on spousal contributions has declined significantly in the past
half century; yet, in 2011, 9% of women received Social Security income
based on spousal contribution, and 16% received widow benefits based
exclusively on their spouse’s work.174
This asset is unavailable to never-married people or people married less
than ten years. The qualification based on an ex-spouse’s work recognizes
the contribution of the nonworking spouse to the household, likely by
providing support and care to the working spouse.175 This special
treatment can reflect a common pattern in which one spouse leaves the
paid workforce, or works half time, to care for the household. Yet, this
benefit is still underinclusive as unmarried partners can be economically
and emotionally interdependent, too. Indeed, according to an analysis by
the Social Security Administration, in 2009, 16% of women aged fifty to
fifty-nine were ineligible to receive Social Security based on spousal
contribution (an increase from 8% in 1990).176
In addition, until 2015, the rules of claiming retirement funds gave
another welcome advantage to married couples: this was a Social Security
filing strategy, known as “file and suspend,” that allowed married couples
to enjoy an 8% annual increase in social security payouts.177 Married or
single, people have always been able to delay getting their Social Security
retirement funds in order to receive a larger amount when they do start
collecting. But during this “waiting period,” married persons—under the
eliminated loophole—could simultaneously collect other Social Security

172. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 167, at 6 tbl.1.
173. Social Security benefits based on spousal contribution go predominantly to women, as less
than 1% who received benefits in 2012 based on their spouse were male. See id. at 27 n.33.
174. Id. at 27.
175. Although collecting social security based on an ex-spouse’s work does not reduce an exspouse’s eligibility to benefit. Retirement Planner: If You Are Divorced, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/divspouse.html [https://perma.cc/M46W-VH7T] (“The amount
of benefits you get has no effect on the amount of benefits your ex-spouse or their current spouse may
receive.” (emphasis deleted)).
176. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 167, at 28.
177. Jonnelle Marte, One of the Most Lucrative Social Security Strategies for Married Couples Is
Being Eliminated, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/getthere/wp/2015/11/03/one-of-the-most-lucrative-social-security-strategies-for-married-couples-isbeing-eliminated/ [https://perma.cc/G37D-S9VX].
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benefits based on their spouse’s eligibility. Accordingly, when the
suspending spouse (Spouse A) filed and suspended in regard to Spouse
A’s own benefits, this spouse was entitled to start receiving payments from
Spouse B’s Social Security fund—and, all that while, Spouse A’s
suspended benefits continued to grow. This option was available only to
those able to delay getting their own retirement payouts and who had
spouses entitled to such—in other words, to those doing well financially.
In 2015, President Obama’s budget deal eliminated this loophole.
Dropping “file and suspend” was a good step in the right direction, but
Social Security still provides preferential treatment to married couples,178
which is yet another factor in retention of their wealth and their ability to
transfer more of it to the next generation.
2.

Laws that Distinguish Couples Based on Marital Status

Under this category, the Article includes legal mechanisms that treat
married couples uniquely, based solely on marital status, and thus result
in paving the way for wealth accumulation. It starts with retirement plans
and then moves to rules concerning intramarital wealth transfers.
Retirement Plans: Retirement assets are the middle class’s secondlargest component of wealth (after home ownership).179 Retirement plans
convert income into wealth directly and thus serve as a major wealth
escalator.180 In 2010, an estimated 71% of married households age 50–64
years old had some form of retirement plan (with a median of $122,560
in their retirement plan), while only 39% of single male households
(median of $50,000) and 48% of single female households (median of
$32,800) had such plans.181 In 2015, almost 12,000 estate tax returns were
filed at the IRS.182 Around 65% of these estates (7804) had retirement
assets that amounted to close to $11 billion.183
Retirement savings offer a few benefits to married couples that are
178. Steve Vernon, How Married Couples Can Max Out Their Social Security, CBS NEWS:
MONEYWATCH (Feb. 5, 2016, 5:45 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-married-couplescan-max-out-their-social-security/ [https://perma.cc/PGH2-2VV8]; see also Tom Anderson, Married
Couples Have 81 Ways to Claim Social Security. Here’s How to Maximize Your Benefits, CNBC (last
updated June 6, 2017, 8:06 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/02/how-married-couples-canmaximize-their-social-security-benefits.html [https://perma.cc/664Z-KNUG] (“The Social Security
shopping mall has 81 stores for married couples . . . .”).
179. CHANG, supra note 22, at 10.
180. Id. at 40.
181. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 167, at 33–34.
182. SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Statistics Filing Year Table 1, supra note 98 (click link to table for
2015).
183. See id.
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unavailable to single or unmarried couples.184 One example is Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs), one of the growing types of retirement
savings. In 2013, IRAs included assets worth approximately $6 trillion,
“accounting for 28 percent of U.S. retirement assets.”185 IRAs allow
eligible contributors to receive tax deductions, to defer tax on growth and
earnings, and, depending on eligibility, may provide nonrefundable tax
credits.186
IRAs provide some advantages to married couples over singles or
unmarried couples. First, for one to contribute money to an IRA, the
contributor must have earned taxable income.187 However, married
persons who file a joint tax return can contribute to IRAs if their spouses
have taxable compensation.188 The implication is that a working spouse
can contribute $5,500 annually (or $6,500 if the nonworking spouse is
over fifty) for the nonworking spouse. At the same time, a single person
who is not making any income cannot contribute to IRAs (and cannot have
someone else contribute on their behalf), and a single earning person
cannot support another person. IRAs also grant some help, not available
to others, in early withdrawals of funds without penalty to spouses. For
example, an IRA holder may withdraw funds early, without penalty, if the
money is used to pay qualified higher-education expenses incurred by the
spouse.189
Second, while an unmarried individual can inherit IRA funds, just as a
surviving spouse can, married couples have some financial advantages in
such a scenario. Surviving spouses can roll over the inherited funds from
the deceased spouse’s IRA into their own IRA, thus enjoying continued
tax deferral.190 If a surviving spouse is under fifty-nine and the
contributing spouse died before the latter was seventy years old, the

184. See Ruth Colker, The Freedom to Choose to Marry, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 383, 420
(2015) (arguing that “[t]he benefits of marriage are important when it is time to retire, especially if
the couple has experienced a traditional marriage”).
185. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 167, at 10.
186. Denise Appleby, IRA Contributions: Deductions and Tax Credits, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/retirement/05/022105.asp [https://perma.cc/82GJ-2PE3].
187. Topic
No.
451—Individual
Retirement
Arrangements
(IRAs),
IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc451.html [https://perma.cc/ZY8Y-WN45] (last updated Sept. 21,
2017).
188. Id.
189. I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(E) (2012).
190. See Clark v. Rameker, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 2245 (2014) (“An inherited IRA is a
traditional or Roth IRA that has been inherited after its owner’s death. . . . If the heir is the owner’s
spouse, as is often the case, the spouse has a choice: He or she may ‘roll over’ the IRA funds into his
or her own IRA, or he or she may keep the IRA as an inherited IRA . . . .” (citations omitted)).
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surviving spouse will not be taxed on the required minimum distribution
until the surviving spouse reaches the age of seventy.191 Conversely,
beneficiaries of an IRA who are not spouses cannot roll over the funds
into their IRA or continue contributing to the IRA.192 A nonspouse
beneficiary who inherits IRA funds has a few options, depending on the
age of the IRA holder. If the IRA owner was younger than 70.5 years (the
mandated time at which the funds distribution begins), then the nonspouse
beneficiary has three options: lump-sum distribution; distributions over a
five-year period; or distributions spread over the beneficiary’s life
expectancy, with the first distribution beginning within a year of
inheritance.193 While the life expectancy option “is preferable to a lumpsum distribution . . . it is not as attractive as a spousal rollover.”194 In sum,
the rules offer beneficiaries who are not surviving spouses less flexibility
in tax planning to maximize the funds from the IRA.
Wealth Consolidators: Another set of taxation rules privileges married
couples over all other family types, enabling them to transfer wealth
between the spouses—and to their heirs—in a way that significantly
enhances wealth accumulation and retention. Married couples are the
wealthiest group in the United States195 and marriage is likely the best and
most efficient estate-planning tool, resulting in a substantial economic
boon for married couples.196
Since the enactment of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
spouses can transfer 100% of their assets between each other without
incurring tax consequences, an estate tool commonly known as the

191. Ray Martin, How to Inherit an IRA (Sept. 13, 2013, 10:55 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-to-inherit-an-ira/ [https://perma.cc/J5B8-3G3H].
192. I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(C); Clark, 134 S. Ct. at 2245 (“When anyone other than the owner’s spouse
inherits the IRA, he or she may not roll over the funds; the only option is to hold the IRA as an
inherited account.”).
193. See id.; IRS, PUBLICATION 590-B: DISTRIBUTIONS FROM INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT
ARRANGEMENTS
(IRAS)
9–11
(2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p590b.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FC3P-LYER] (discussing the rules concerning individual designated beneficiaries).
194. SID MITTRA, ANANDI P. SAHU & BRIAN FISCHER, PRACTICING FINANCIAL PLANNING: FOR
PROFESSIONALS AND CFP® ASPIRANTS 774 (2016).
195. CHANG, supra note 22, at 20.
196. Bridget J. Crawford, One Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A New Approach to Marriage and Wealth
Transfer-Taxation, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 757, 759 (2004) (“Marriage is an excellent estate planning
strategy.”); Joshua S. Rubenstein, Estate Planning for Unmarried Partners, N.Y.U. REVIEW OF
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS § 21.01 (2008), https://www.kattenlaw.com/files/19823_Rubenstein—
Chapter—Estate_Planning_for_Unmarried.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LCR-AACX] (“From an estate
planning perspective, many estate planning devices favor married couples—particularly those that
involve the marital deduction. There are any number of loopholes to favored estate planning devices
over the years that have been “plugged” for spouses but not for unmarried partners.”).
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“marital deduction.”197 This means that married couples are treated as one
economic unit for purposes of estate and gift taxes.198 The benefit of the
marital deduction is that it allows spouses to strategically transfer wealth
from the wealthier spouse to the less wealthy spouse, and, in that way, to
maximize favorable tax rules (tax deductions, exemptions, exclusions,
credits, and lower tax rates).199 Additionally, the transfer allows spouses
to delay the payment of estate tax until the death of the surviving
spouse.200
In addition to the marital deduction, individuals (unmarried or married)
receive a unified credit for both estate and gift taxes, and can transfer
$5.45 million without taxation to persons other than their spouses. This
amount is double for married couples ($10.90 million in 2016).201
The double exclusion that each individual spouse enjoys in the area of
wealth taxation should not be taken for granted. In some other provisions
of the tax code, married couples do not receive such a “double deduction”;
rather, they have a separate tax rate equal to less than the doubled amount
of one individual.202 In other cases, the advantage that the spouses can
claim together is equal to what one individual may claim. For instance,
married couples can apply up to $3,000 of net capital losses against
ordinary income, the same amount an individual can apply.203
Further, since 2010, married couples have another helpful implement
197. Moore, supra note 148, at 255, 261 (“A primary justification for bestowing benefits on
married taxpayers in the income and transfer tax systems, currently, is the policy pronouncement that
married individuals constitute economic units and should not be required to account for intramarriage
transfers, but only for transfers outside of the economic unit.”).
198. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97–34, § 403, 95 Stat. 172, 301–05 (1981)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
199. Crawford, supra note 196, at 759.
200. Id.
201. I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (2012). Furthermore, as of 2015, donors of lifetime gifts are provided an
annual exclusion of $14,000 per donee. If the non-donor spouse consents to split the gift with the
donor spouse, then the annual exclusion is $28,000 per donee. H.R. Rep. No. 114–64, at 5 (2015).
Finally, a gift or bequest of appreciated (or loss) property is not an income-tax realization event for
the transferor. This means that property acquired from a decedent’s estate generally takes a steppedup basis. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (“[T]he basis of property in the hands of a person acquiring the property
from a decedent or to whom the property passed from a decedent shall, if not sold, exchanged, or
otherwise disposed of before the decedent’s death by such person, be . . . the fair market value of the
property at the date of the decedent’s death.”).
202. See Seto, supra note 146, at 1560–80 (providing a detailed account of anti-abuse tax
provisions under which married couples’ tax liability does not equal double the individual’s; rather,
married couples receive specific rates for their benefits).
203. 26 U.S.C. § 1211 (2012); Tessa R. Davis, Mapping the Families of the Internal Revenue Code,
22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 179, 235 (2015) (“Yet, when that same married couple calculates capital
gain for the year, the Code limits their losses to the same amount as that of a single individual:
$3000.”).
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in their estate tax toolkit: portability.204 Prior to the enactment of
portability, spouses could not transfer the estate tax credit ($5.45 million
per spouse in 2016) to the surviving spouse; the credit only applied to the
individual decedent’s taxable estate.205 Spouses could plan, and often have
planned, transfers of wealth between themselves to maximize the use of
the unified credit, but this requires some arranging as well as foresight
into which spouse will die first.206 Portability makes such planning easier
because it allows the surviving spouse to use the deceased spouse’s
unused amount of unified credit. For example: a married couple consists
of Spouse A, who has not used his unified credit before death and has left
a $2 million estate to his son, and Spouse B, who, after the death of Spouse
A, owns assets worth $2 million dollars and has exhausted his amount of
unified credit by transferring to their son a gift worth $5.45 million.
Before portability, Spouse B would have needed to transfer $2 million
worth of assets to Spouse A prior to the latter’s death, to take advantage
of Spouse A’s available exemption at his death. With portability, Spouse
A’s $3.45 million unused credit is available to Spouse B to guarantee his
future gratuitous transfers to anyone he would like.207
But while it seems that portability merely provides married couples an
efficient estate-planning tool by making it easier to exhaust the available
credits, it actually “allow[s] spouses to obtain better tax results than they
could have with the best estate planning.”208 While with estate planning,
as described in the example above, the couple could have avoided taxes
on $9.45 million (Spouse B uses his $5.45 million credit and transfers
assets worth $2 million to Spouse A; Spouse A uses $2 million of his own
credit), with portability, this couple can shelter up to $10.90 million
(Spouse A transfers his unused credit of $3.45 million in addition to the
$2 million he used and the $5.45 that Spouse B used). Moreover, the
surviving spouse could use this extra time to consume some part of the
estate and reduce the estate tax. Congress was aware that portability
provides an extra benefit (beyond the ease of planning) solely to married
204. In 2010, the portability provision was only temporary. See Tax Relief, Unemployment
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 303, 124 Stat. 3296,
3302–04 (2010). In 2012, it became permanent. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L.
No. 112-240, § 101(c)(2), 126 Stat. 2313, 2318 (2013).
205. Steve L. Dellinger & Nathan L. Wadlinger, The Portability Pill: Examining the Trial Stages
of Federal Estate and Gift Tax Spousal Portability, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 367, 368–69
(2012).
206. Kerry A. Ryan, Marital Sharing of Transfer Tax Exemptions, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1067
(2016).
207. Id. at 1067–68.
208. Id. at 1069.
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couples but chose to keep it this way.209 “As such, portability becomes a
quasi-tax credit available only to married individuals.”210
Although portability has been applauded by some as a relatively
efficient estate-planning tool that is consistent with the direction of estate
tax,211 law professor Phyllis Taite offers a strong critique of portability.
She argues that “[t]he primary, if not sole function, of the portability
provision is to permit more wealth transmission to persons other than a
surviving spouse. As such, portability is another form of shifting more
wealth to the already wealthiest households.”212 Indeed, the Joint
Committee on Taxation estimates that 54% of estates would benefit from
portability after ten years.213
These benefits—the marital deduction and portability—are not
available to unmarried couples. The result is a significant advantage to the
wealthiest married couples over other households.214 But not only are
these rules underinclusive––that is, they do not treat nonmarried families
the same as married households––the result is that they allow those who
are already well-off to gain more wealth. With some estate planning, these
benefits essentially let married couples lower their estate tax considerably,
or even avoid it altogether, and thereby keep their fortunes in the family.
Marriage, in effect, serves as a tax maximizer to preserve wealth within
the family. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the Tax
Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act
of 2010—which made the estate tax rate 35%, with an applicable
exclusion amount of $5 million—would cost $67.5 billion over the years
2011 to 2015.215
209. Id.
210. Dellinger & Wadlinger, supra note 205, at 397. Furthermore, an additional benefit of
portability is that it allows the couple to use a double step-up basis: calculating the estate as fair market
value on the date of the decedent’s death and thus avoiding capital gain on the appreciation—the first
step-up basis comes when the decedent spouse dies, and then the second step-up in basis is realized
at the surviving spouse’s death. Id.
211. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS
WITHIN A FAMILY: A DISCUSSION OF SELECTED AREAS FOR POSSIBLE REFORM 10 (2008)
(“Therefore, allowing for portability between spouses of unused exemption arguably would contribute
to simplicity and facilitate compliance with the law, because it largely would eliminate the need for
couples to employ the credit shelter trust strategy or to monitor and adjust the titling of assets.”).
212. Taite, supra note 155, at 216.
213. Dellinger & Wadlinger, supra note 205, at 407.
214. Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual Tax Filing
in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605, 644 (2010) (“As a result, the income, estate, and gift
tax rules permit the shifting of substantial amounts of property within most nuclear and extended
traditional families free of concerns about federal taxes.”).
215. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE
“TAX RELIEF, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REAUTHORIZATION, AND JOB CREATION ACT OF 2010”
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Data available from 2010 show how these massive exemptions
encourage intergenerational transfers by married households. The data
reveal that, in just over half of all estate tax returns, the decedents were
married; in another 36%, they were widowed.216 Only 13% of decedents
were single, divorced, or separated.217 Further, over 97% of the estates of
married decedents, and 48% of estates overall, reported deductions for
marital bequests, for a total of $42 billion.218 Only 9% of estates with a
marital bequest owed estate tax.219
3.

Privatization Norms Encourage Married Couples to Keep Wealth
in the Family

There are “strong cultural expectations in the United States for wealth
to remain in the immediate family through bequests to spouses and
children.”220 Rules concerning intergenerational transfers reinforce these
cultural norms, encouraging families to keep their wealth for the next
generation rather than to redistribute it outside the family. Some rules
provide clear incentives to keep wealth within the family, while others
send a message that doing so is the norm.221
These conventions are often stronger with regard to the married
household. Federal estate and gift tax rules provide many benefits to
married couples that encourage them to transfer wealth between
themselves and to minimize the amount subject to the estate tax—rules
that are not extended to nonmarried couples, to other relatives, or to
nonfamily members.222 The clearest example of legal directives that
incentivize interspousal transfers are the rules discussed in section II.C.2,
above, whose main justification is to reward bequests within the married
4 (2010).
216. IRS, ESTATE TAX STATISTICS (2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10esesttaxsnap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3EED-R4PF].
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Stephen J. McNamee & Robert K. Miller, Jr., Estate Inheritance: A Sociological Lacuna, 59
SOC. INQUIRY 7, 18 (1989).
221. Other rules that provide incentives to keep wealth within the family, and are not discussed in
this subsection, include I.R.C. § 6166, which provides a ten-year extension of time to pay estate tax
where the estate consists of family-owned business interests; and I.R.C. § 2032A, which provides
special valuation rules for real estate transferred to a “member of the decedent’s family.” For
discussion of these provisions see Bridget J. Crawford, The Profits and Penalties of Kinship:
Conflicting Meanings of Family in Estate Tax Law, 3 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 63 (2005).
222. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 196, at 792; Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth
Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1219 (1983).
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family.223
State inheritance laws provide similar incentives; they sometimes tax
inheritance to family members (other than the spouse) more favorably
than inheritance to nonfamily members.224 For example, the general
inheritance tax rate in Pennsylvania is 15%, which is reduced to 12% for
transfers to siblings, a mere 4.5% for transfers to lineal heirs, and 0% to
surviving spouses.225 In Kentucky, surviving spouses, parents, children,
grandchildren, siblings, and half-siblings are entirely exempt from paying
inheritance taxes.226 Such laws exemplify how legal devices reflect and
perpetuate the social norm of encouraging wealth concentration within
families. This effect is even more pronounced with regard to married
couples. As mentioned above, in Pennsylvania and Kentucky, property
inherited from a spouse is exempt from inheritance tax.227
In addition, by providing protection from disinheritance to a spouse,
the state communicates that wealth, or at least a part of it, should stay in
the family and particularly the marital family.228 Likewise, when a person
dies intestate, the default rules designate the spouse and children—and, in
their absence, other relatives—as the primary beneficiaries.229
This set of legal rules also attests to a strong norm of privatization of
support and dependency in the United States. Privatizing support is part
of a larger neoliberal approach that seeks to transfer economic risks from

223. See Anne L. Alstott, Commentary Family Values, Inheritance Law, and Inheritance Taxation,
63 TAX L. REV. 123, 131–32 (2009) (“[T]he state might craft an inheritance tax so that it rewards gifts
and bequests within the family. The U.S. federal estate tax arguably does something like this by giving
an unlimited spousal exemption.”).
224. Margaret Ryznar, The Odd Couple: The Estate Tax and Family Law, 76 LA. L. REV. 523, 529
(2015).
225. Inheritance Tax for Pennsylvania Residents, PA. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
http://www.montcopa.org/284/Inheritance-Tax-for-Pennsylvania-Residen [https://perma.cc/46WU2PQQ].
226. Whereas close lineal relatives are exempt from the Kentucky inheritance tax, other
beneficiaries must pay anywhere between 4% and 16%. See Mary Randolph, Kentucky Inheritance
Tax,
NOLO,
http://www.executorscorner.com/resources/kentucky-inheritance-tax.html
[https://perma.cc/9AWS-R9U2].
227. PA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 225.
228. The justifications for elective share have been the subjects of extensive debates. The current
prevailing theory is that elective share stems from marriage as an economic partnership. As such, the
doctrine recognizes the surviving spouse’s contribution to the relationship, and elective share serves
as a form of restitution or as an implied contract. See generally Rena C. Seplowitz, Transfers Prior
to Marriage and the Uniform Probate Code’s Redesigned Elective Share—Why the Partnership Is
Not Yet Complete, 25 IND. L. REV. 1, 48 (1991) (discussing the different theories for elective share).
Thus, the doctrine of elective share protects spouses from losing their share based on their
contributions, but it adds another layer of laws that assume that wealth should remain in the family.
229. Strand, supra note 37, at 464.
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the collective to families themselves.230 In neoliberal thought, the role of
marriage is to “impose discipline and privatized dependency among the
poor.”231 Marriage is a “gendered institution for privatizing social costs—
women, dependent on husbands or the low-wage job market, must bear
responsibility for child care costs.”232 The ideology that the married
family is at the center of society, and is the primary unit for support in
time of economic crises, sends a signal that it is the spouses’ role to take
care of one another. Keeping wealth within the family might be part of the
spouses’ roles.
Privatization of support is one of the keystones of family law in the
United States.233 The state “recognizes and bestows benefits on families
so that they will serve a private welfare function, minimizing reliance on
state and federal coffers.”234 Various doctrines enforce the role of the
family in caregiving and general support. For instance, Maxine Eichner
shows how aspects of employment law related to caregiving
responsibility—particularly Title VII and the Family and Medical Leave
Act—reflect the notion that dependency and care are private matters
performed without state support.235 As the state has created many
mechanisms that enforce the ideal of family as a private support system,
transfer of wealth within the family falls squarely into this ideology and
may incentivize families to retain wealth in order to fulfil their role as
private providers of such basic needs as health, caregiving, and education.
The ideology that shifts the burden of care to private hands impacts
society’s rich, too. To succeed in a world in which goods like education
are private, affluent families must preserve wealth. For families at the top
10% of wealth distribution it means paying for quality care from a young
age, living in school districts in which housing is more expensive, and
saving money for college, to name only a few items. For families at the
top 1%, privatization looks different. A recent article in Town and
Country magazine provides a good anecdote on why wealthy families
want to accumulate wealth.236 The article aimed to imagine the net worth
230. Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs? Toward a Political Economy of Sexuality,
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1539, 1558 (2006).
231. LISA DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY? NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL POLITICS, AND
THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY 64 (2003).
232. Id.
233. Ryznar, supra note 224, at 540–45.
234. Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1835,
1866–67 (2014).
235. MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S
POLITICAL IDEALS 28–39 (2010).
236. Norman Vanamee, Here’s Exactly How Much Money You Need to Be Happy, TOWN &
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that “a typical wealthy family living in New York City”—which
constitutes “a married couple in their forties with two teenage kids”—
needs for living.237 The amount calculated was $190 million to sustain a
lifestyle of an uber-rich New York family and includes “the cost of a noexpense-spared educational strategy that included extensive private
tutoring, music lessons, sports, enrichment activities, private school, trips
abroad, and, ultimately, four years in the Ivy League.”238 This amount is
estimated at $1.7 million per child. Norms of privatization are obviously
impacting socioeconomic groups in significantly different ways, but
privatization has an impact on all families.
To conclude, the marital wealth gap is aggravated by a host of rules and
norms that support accumulation of wealth within married households and
are either unavailable to nonmarried households or beneficial primarily to
married couples. The next section looks at another, final elucidation of the
marital wealth gap.
D.

Assortative Mating Exacerbates Wealth Inequality

The marital wealth gap has another, more subtle, explanation: the
extent to which wealth marries wealth. Class-based mating patterns,
founded on parental and personal wealth, are a great contributor to the
growing wealth inequality. This section begins by unveiling how and why
positive assortative mating patterns keep accelerating, and how they
increase wealth inequality in the United States. It then contends that the
law entrenches or even exacerbates these patterns by supporting, and
failing to combat, the conditions for the growth of positive assortative
mating.
1.

Individuals Select Partners Based on Parental Wealth

The patterns of marriage and partner selection have an effect on wealth
distribution. Put simply, if people marry people from similar economic
strata, the result is less social mobility and more concentration of wealth,
because inherited fortunes are not generally distributed away from the
lineal heirs.239 As Thomas Piketty explains,
At the level of the family, it is obvious why positive assortative

COUNTRY
(Nov.
16,
2017),
http://www.townandcountrymag.com/society/money-andpower/a13528013/how-much-money-you-need-to-be-happy/ [https://perma.cc/QGK5-TC49].
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. OSBERG, supra note 24, at 203.
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mating can contribute to make inequality more persistent across
generations: if children’s abilities depend on the characteristics of
both parents, then the fact that men and women with similar
characteristics tend to mate together makes intergenerational
mobility lower than it would be under random matching.240
If, on the other hand, individuals marry people from higher economic
groups, then the concentration of inherited wealth will likely decrease and
the distribution of inherited wealth is likely to equalize over
generations.241 Undeniably, acquiring wealth through marriage is a
familiar story in United States culture, and most people do not oppose
acquiring wealth by marriage (as opposed to acquiring wealth through
inheritance).242 Some even view it as a characteristic of a meritocracy—
using personality and perhaps physical appearance to achieve upward
mobility.243 One study found that the majority of people who identify as
poor or working class prefer that their children “marry up.”244
To find out whether individuals in a certain society tend to marry
people from different socioeconomic backgrounds, we need to understand
the factors that lead individuals to select certain partners. This section
examines patterns of “assortative mating”—the term sociologists and
economists use to describe a phenomenon in which individuals sort
partners who share similar characteristics (homogenous selection).245
Generally, a higher degree of assortative mating indicates that people

240. Thomas Piketty, Theories of Persistent Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility, in 1
HANDBOOK OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 429, 467 (Anthony B. Atkinson & Franois Bourguignon eds.,
2000).
241. OSBERG, supra note 24, at 203.
242. McNamee & Miller, supra note 66, at 195; see also Matthew Clayton, Equal Inheritance: An
Anti-perfectionist View, in INHERITED WEALTH, JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 98, 98 (John Cunliffe, Guido
Erreygers eds., 2013) (“[U]nequal inheritance, which produces unequal life chances, appears to be
problematic from the point of view of egalitarian justice. . . . [T]he sheer good luck of being born to
wealthy parents, for example, is not, according to most egalitarians, a cause of inequality that justifies
the inequality it causes.” (citation omitted)).
243. McNamee & Miller, supra note 66, at 195.
244. LEONARD BEEGHLEY, STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 110
(2008).
245. See HANS PETER BLOSSFELD & ANDREAS TIMM, WHO MARRIES WHOM? EDUCATIONAL
SYSTEMS AS MARRIAGE MARKETS IN MODERN SOCIETIES 1–6 (2003); Ana Swanson, The Real
Reason Some People End Up with Partners Who Are Way More Attractive, WASH. POST (May 3,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/03/the-real-reason-some-peopleend-up-with-partners-who-are-way-more-attractive/ [https://perma.cc/SLY3-6KKH] (“[C]ouples
tend to be more similar in many respects—including their genetics, physical attractiveness and
cultural characteristics such as religion, politics and socioeconomic status—than two randomly
selected people would be. Scientists call this ‘assortative mating.’”).
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marry others with a similar background.246 Studies on patterns of partner
selection examine the influence of factors relevant to the family of origin,
such as parental education, income, and wealth, and their impact on mate
sorting.247 Likewise, these studies often explore the effect of spouses’
individual characteristics––such as race, ethnicity, religion,
attractiveness, income, and level of education––on partner sorting.248
The effect of educational background on partnership selection is of
special interest in sociology and is a widely explored topic.249 In the
United States, patterns of marriage selection based on education have
become increasingly homogenous and less random.250 In fact, rates of
positive assortative mating based on education grew significantly between
the beginning and end of the twentieth century. Between the 1940s and
1960s, marriage patterns were more class heterogenic than they are
now.251 Between the 1960s and today, educational positive assortative
mating became much more prevalent, leading to a decrease in cross-class
marriages.252 Indeed, the percentage of college graduates who marry other
college graduates has doubled since the 1960s.253 The chance that a
woman with a college degree will marry someone who did not go beyond
a high school education is one in ten.254 This change in marriage
homogeny exists even when controlling for the growing rate of women
who pursue higher education, and hence cannot be attributed only to

246. See BLOSSFELD & TIMM, supra note 245, at 1–6.
247. Id. at 10.
248. See, e.g., Yue Qian, Gender Asymmetry in Educational and Income Assortative Marriage, 79
J. OF MARRIAGE AND FAM. 318, 322 (2017) (“Income assortative mating has received far less
attention than educational assortative mating. Yet in recent decades, income may have become
increasingly important in the selection of marriage partners.”); Megan M. Sweeney & Maria Cancian,
The Changing Importance of Economic Prospects for Assortative Mating, CAL. CTR. FOR
POPULATION
RESEARCH
4
(2001),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.202.4866&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[https://perma.cc/4BTC-7YUL].
249. See Blossfeld & Timm, supra note 245, at 3–5; Qian, supra note 248, at 321.
250. See, e.g., Qian, supra note 248, at 331–33 (analyzing marriage trends from the 1980s onward).
251. CARBONE & CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS, supra note 13, at 62.
252. Christine R. Schwartz & Robert D. Mare, Trends in Educational Assortative Marriage From
1940 to 2003, 42 DEMOGRAPHY 621, 641 (2015) (“The increasing resemblance of spouses in terms
of educational attainment . . . through the late 1980s continued through the 1990s and into the twentyfirst century.”).
253. See Jeremy Greenwood, Nezih Guner, Georgi Kocharkov & Cezar Santos, Marry Your Like:
Assortative Mating and Income Inequality (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
19829, 2014), at 10 tbl.1.
254. ALISON WOLF, THE XX FACTOR: HOW THE RISE OF WORKING WOMEN HAS CREATED A FAR
LESS EQUAL WORLD 207 (2013).
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women closing the education gap during these years.255
Prospective partners do not select their partners based only on similar
income, profession, or educational level. A recent study of couples who
were married in 1998 documented a strong correlation between parental
wealth and marriage selection patterns; it found that individuals are very
likely to marry spouses whose parents have wealth similar to that of their
own parents.256 This study shows that it is especially unlikely for people
from opposite ends of the quintile (the wealthiest and the least wealthy)
to marry one another. For example, only 7% of husbands with parents in
the lowest quintile of parental wealth distribution were married to women
with parents in the top quintile of the parental wealth distribution.257 The
study concludes, “People are hugely likely to marry spouses from similar
parental backgrounds, and the further a spouse’s parental background is
from their own, the sharply lower the incidence of marriage.”258
Importantly, the study found a higher degree of assortative mating based
on parental wealth than on education.259 The likely reason that parental
wealth matters more than education is that, even with uneven levels of
education, individuals with significant parental wealth meet people from
similar socioeconomic backgrounds in places outside universities that
shape the marriage market;260 moreover, wealth is an attractive attribute
in the marriage market.261
What is important for the purpose of this Article is not the affirmation
of one’s intuitive sense that wealth marries wealth. Rather, the studies
about assortative mating based on parental wealth help us to understand
why married couples are more successful in getting and retaining wealth:

255. See, e.g., LASSE EIKA, MAGNA MOGSTAD, & BASIT ZAFAR, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
EDUCATIONAL ASSORTATIVE MATING AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME INEQUALITY 3 (2014),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr682.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MD5Y-T9FT].
256. Kerwin Kofi Charles, Erik Hurst & Alexandra Killewald, Marital Sorting and Parental
Wealth, 50 DEMOGRAPHY 51, 52–53 (2013).
257. Id. at 58.
258. Id. at 59.
259. Id. at 67.
260. Another possible theory for the importance of parental wealth over education is that partners
who marry later might evaluate their financial situation based on actual financial means rather than
proxies for one’s economic situation, such as education. See Valerie K. Oppenheimer, A Theory of
Marriage Timing, 94 AM. J. OF SOC. 563, 563–66 (1988).
261. See Blossfeld & Timm, supra note 237, at 243; Christine R Schwartz, Zhen Zeng & Yu Xie,
Marrying Up by Marrying Down: Status Exchange Between Social Origin and Education in the
United States, 3 SOC. SCI. 1003 (2016) (finding support for the thesis that people with higher
education backgrounds and lower socioeconomic backgrounds tend to marry those with lower
education backgrounds from more privileged socioeconomic backgrounds).
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they not only get more wealth by intergenerational transfers, they also
gain more from marriage by combining wealth from both spouses. Such
marital trends limit wealth equalization and increase wealth
concentration, thereby promoting greater economic disparities between
the haves and have-nots. The data imply that encouraging more people to
get married will not result in significant downward redistribution of
wealth, unless the patterns of selection change.262
Sorting partners based on parental wealth is even more worrisome for
the future. If children of the wealthy continue to select spouses based on
parental wealth, then their children will inherit their wealth and their
spouse’s wealth. Increased assortative mating based on wealth, therefore,
suggests that wealth will become concentrated within an even smaller
group of households than it currently is.263 The result will be exacerbated
inequality of life chances, based on parental wealth. Given the law’s
ineffectiveness in preventing or responding to wealth inequality, on the
one hand, and positive assortative mating trends, on the other, marriage
among wealthy couples is likely to lead to greater wealth concentration.
2.

State’s Support of Positive Assortative Mating

What is the law’s role in these class-based selection patterns? It seems,
prima facie, to have no role, as people’s selection of partners is a product
of multiple highly individualized and personal preferences. However, as
the Article shows below, social policy plays a role in buttressing
homogenous marriage patterns, as people’s ability to meet in certain
venues increases their chances to select partners from different
backgrounds. And vice versa: people’s limited ability to meet individuals
from other socioeconomic backgrounds (in settings where intimate
partners meet) decreases their chances for cross-class relationships. To get
an account of how people sort their partners and how the organization of
social spaces impacts the selection patterns, one needs to understand the
mechanisms of individuals’ attractions.
The main question that scholars debate is whether selection is affected
262. Redistribution is defined as “[t]he act or process of distributing something again or anew.”
Redistribution, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). This Article adopts a broader meaning,
expanding on Nancy Fraser’s definition, which follows:
“[t]he remedy for economic injustice is political-economic restructuring of some sort. This might
involve redistributing income, reorganizing the division of labour, subjecting investment to
democratic decision-making, or transforming other basic economic structures. Although these
various remedies differ importantly from one another, I shall henceforth refer to the whole group
of them by the generic term ‘redistribution.’”
Fraser, supra note 20, at 73.
263. See MARINA ADSHADE, DIRTY MONEY: THE ECONOMICS OF SEX AND LOVE 99 (2013).
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by exposure to diverse populations and opportunities to meet others, or by
innate personal preferences that are hard to modify. In sociology, these
two possible options derive from “the supply-side perspective,” which
argues that the networks and social contexts in which people participate
make up the pool from which they select their mates.264 In other words,
according to this viewpoint, “assortative mating is fostered by assortative
meeting.”265 “Demand-side theories,” conversely, emphasize personal
decisions and preferences in selecting mates.266 If demand-side theories
fully explain the phenomenon under discussion, then social policies that
enable economic segregation or integration have little or nothing to do
with mating selection. But if these are not mutually exclusive theories,
then part of the reason that people marry individuals from similar
socioeconomic backgrounds is of our own design.
The sociological research in the area suggests that exposure to a pool
of people from different backgrounds matters for assortative mating. In a
2013 study, professors Michèle Belot and Marco Francesconi considered
whether assortative mating primarily reflects an intrinsic personal
preference or, rather, people’s greater access to peers from their own
social cohorts.267 To examine the issue, the researchers studied 1800 male
and 1800 female speed-daters from eighty-four speed-dating events.268
During these events, each participant would attend roughly twenty-two
“dates” lasting three minutes each; at the end of the night, each participant
would submit a form to the agency, listing the names of the partners they
want to see again.269 The speed-dating environment was designed to
reduce the issue of disproportionate access to similarly situated
individuals to see whether assortative mating still appeared when meeting
opportunities were broadened beyond a person’s ordinary social circle.
The study concluded that innate personal preferences and meeting
opportunities are both responsible for assortative mating.270 First, the
researchers observed that even when given equal opportunities to meet
diverse types of people the speed-daters tended to gravitate toward others

264. Matthijs Kalmijn & Henk Flap, Assortative Meeting and Mating: Unintended Consequences
of Organized Settings for Partner Choices, 79 SOC. FORCES 1289, 1290 (2001).
265. Id. at 1309.
266. Id. at 1290.
267. Michèle Belot & Marco Francesconi, Dating Preferences and Meeting Opportunities in Mate
Choice Decisions, 48 J. HUMAN RES. 475, 475–77 (2013).
268. Id. at 480.
269. Id. at 479–80.
270. Id. at 477.
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of similar age, height, and education level.271 Second, the researchers
observed that, regardless of each dater’s personal attributes, some traits
seemed universally to be more desirable than others. For both genders,
younger partners were most frequently “proposed to” via the matching
service at the end of the events. Women preferred nonsmoking males,
while men preferred women with higher education.272 Although the
foregoing traits were generally desired, the composition of each speeddating group influenced their relative popularity. The researchers noticed
a direct correlation between the prevalence of a trait and its desirability.
For example, when there were only a handful of women with higher
education at an event, these women tended to receive fewer proposals than
did higher-educated women at an event teeming with such women.273
Thus, the effect of innate preferences on assortative mating may be
compounded by the greater number of similarly situated individuals in a
person’s circle.
This finding does not support the intuitive assumption that people’s
innate desire to meet a similar mate drives them to seek social circles with
more similarly situated people, for the speed-daters in the study did not
have any say in the composition of the dating groups they joined. Rather,
the simple fact that similarly situated people tend to predominate in a
person’s social circle increases the prevalence-based desirability of those
traits. This, in combination with people’s innate attraction to similarly
situated partners, reinforces assortative mating.
Another recent study examined whether having greater racial diversity
in a classroom’s cohort affects the probability that interracial intimate
relationships will be formed. The study found that, on average for
nonblack students, having 2% more black students than in the average
cohort increases the chances of those students having future intimate
relationships with black students by 0.6%.274
Beyond the availability of diverse potential partners, some spheres are
of particular importance to marriage markets and to assortative mating.
Dutch researchers used data from married and cohabiting couples in the
Netherlands to examine whether couples who met through common social
settings (work, school, neighborhood, family connections, or community
organizations) were more likely to align in terms of each partner’s age,
271. Id.
272. Id. at 497.
273. Id.
274. Luca Paolo Merlino, Max Friedrich Steinhardt & Liam Wren-Lewis, More Than Just Friends?
School Peers and Adult Interracial Relationships 3 (July 23, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2999043 [https://perma.cc/SD5N-ZJ4C].
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education, religion, class upbringing, and present socioeconomic status
than couples who did not meet through these venues.275 The researchers
found that 42% of the couples met through at least one of the five
organized social settings, with school and family connections accounting
for the greatest proportion of meeting opportunities.276 Partners who met
at the same school had a higher incidence of aligning along most of the
attribute metrics.277 Partners who met at the same workplace were more
likely to belong to the same socioeconomic class at the time that they met.
However, the homogenizing effects of the other social settings, while
extant, were not as strong.278 Further, the results revealed that the couples
who met at random or through mutual friends, rather than through one of
the five organized settings, also tended to align in terms of their personal
attributes. The study thus suggests that, while meeting opportunities
certainly play a significant role, “preferences remain an important source
of homogamy in partner choice.”279
The bottom line of these studies is that both personal preferences and
meeting pools, especially in particular settings, make a difference in
regard to intimate selection. This means that increasing meetings among
people from different backgrounds can result in an upturn of cross-cultural
relationships. At the same time, fewer opportunities for people from
different socioeconomic backgrounds to meet may be another explanation
for the growing trend of socioeconomic-based selection.
But current policies drive toward further socioeconomic separation and
a decrease in cross-class relationships. Irrefutably, today the United States
features growing socioeconomic segregation and fewer opportunities for
encounters between people from different economic strata.280 In the past
three decades, residential segregation by income has increased. According
to data by the Pew Research Center, 28% of lower-income households in
2010 were located in a majority lower-income census tract, up from 23%
in 1980.281 At the same time, 18% of upper-income households were
275. Kalmijn & Flap, supra note 256, at 1289.
276. Id. at 1297–98.
277. Id. at 1289.
278. Id. at 1309.
279. Id. at 1309.
280. See generally Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs? Toward a Political Economy
of Sexuality, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1539, 1553 (2006) (“This concern with family life as the
creation and protection of private space, when played out in a legal environment that permits affluent
localities to separate themselves from the concerns of poor localities, has meant the erosion of any
sense of ‘linked fate’ between rich and poor, black and white.”).
281. Richard Fry & Paul Taylor, The Rise of Residential Segregation by Income, PEW RES. CTR.
(Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/08/01/the-rise-of-residential-segregation-by-
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located in a majority upper-income census tract, up from 9% in 1980. The
law’s role here is beyond mere inaction. As Richard Reeves explains,
“This inverse ghettoization is a product of a complex web of local rules
and regulations regarding the use of land. The rise of ‘exclusionary
zoning,’ designed to protect the home values, schools, and neighborhoods
of the affluent, has badly distorted the American property market.”282
Moreover, “[z]oning ordinances . . . have become important mechanisms
for incorporating class divisions into urban physical geographies.”283
This growing residential ghettoization is mirrored in school segregation
patterns. Indeed, “[e]conomic sorting at the neighborhood level leads to
social sorting in terms of schools, churches, and community groups. This
means fewer interactions and social ties across social classes.”284 Data
consistently show that from the 1970s to 2010, school populations became
more homogenous socioeconomically.285 According to a 2016 study, in
the public school system, between-district differences in income
segregation increased by over 15% from 1990 to 2010.286
The cost of higher education serves as another barrier for meeting
people from different economic strata.287 Numerous studies indicate that
education is one of the most significant sources of assortative mating,
because attending college provides an opportunity to meet potential
spouses and because people tend to self-select partners with a similar
education level.288 Further, as couples get married at older ages, the
income/#fn-14312-1 [https://perma.cc/LB4E-VPAT].
282. REEVES, supra note 32, at 102.
283. Id. at 103.
284. Id. at 106.
285. See, e.g., Sean Corcoran & William N. Evans, Income Inequality, The Median Voter, and the
Support for Public Education 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16097, 2010)
(“[M]ost U.S. school districts experienced growth in income inequality between 1970 and 2000.”),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16097.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD9M-YAZN]; Ann Owens, Sean F.
Reardon & Christopher Jencks, Trends in School Economic Segregation, 1970 to 2010, 22 (Stanford
Ctr. for Educ. Policy Analysis Working Paper, 2014) (“Economic segregation between schools and
school
districts
has
increased
over
the
past
several
decades.”),
https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/owens%20reardon%20jencks%20school%20income%20
segregation%20july2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/MSU7-XGJ2].
286. Ann Owens, Sean F. Reardon & Christopher Jencks, Income Segregation Between Schools
and School Districts, 53 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 1159, 1159 (2016).
287. Beyond the price of higher education, there are other significant advantages to wealthier
people in college admissions, from the college admission process to a preferential advantage if their
parents graduated from the same college. See REEVES, supra note 32, at 107–09.
288. Belot and Francesconi’s study of speed-daters attests to the important role that meeting
opportunities play in fueling assortative mating. See supra note 267. In 2013, Facebook analyzed its
users’ data to determine that 28% of married couples attended the same college. Cara Newton, College
Students Still Often Find Spouses on Campus (Oct. 17, 2013, 7:50 AM),
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likelihood of finding a partner in educational institutions increases.289 The
rising cost of college tuition serves as a barrier to pursue higher education
and likely increases incidents of homogenous marriage. College tuition
has escalated twelve-fold since 1978, far surpassing the inflation rate.290
Although some lower-income students have opted to incur more debt,291
others have been unable to attend college due to the hefty price tag.292
A 2017 study that relied on data from 30 million students who attended
college in the years 1999–2013 affirms that college has become a more
homogenous place in socioeconomic terms. This study has documented
that, among the most prestigious universities, more students come from
families in the top 1% of income distribution (14.5%) than the bottom half
of income distribution (13.5%).293
For these reasons, Arnold Kling, former economist for the Federal
Reserve System, bluntly asserts that “the value of college is in assortative
mating.”294 Accordingly, the notion that college is a vehicle for assortative
mating “explains rising tuition costs. If your goal as a parent is to put your
child in a milieu of affluent children, then a school with higher tuition may

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/15/college-marriage-facebook/2989039/
[https://perma.cc/QDB9-CXZ5]. Although not all these couples met at their respective colleges, as
partners may have attended at different times or attended at the same time but never crossed paths,
Facebook’s finding still supports the notion that people tend to gravitate toward partners with a similar
educational level.
289. Robert D. Mare, Five Decades of Educational Assortative Mating, 56 AM. SOC. REV. 15, 15
(1991).
290. Michelle Jamrisko & Ilan Kolet, Cost of College Degree in U.S. Soars 12 Fold: Chart of the
Day, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-0815/cost-of-college-degree-in-u-s-soars-12-fold-chart-of-the-day [https://perma.cc/MW9Y-DY82].
291. Total outstanding student debt has quadrupled since 2003, surpassing all other forms of debt,
including credit card debt. Ann Marie Weirsch, The Cost of College: Student Loan Debt on the Rise,
FOREFRONT,
at
10
(2014)
https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-andevents/publications/forefront/ff-v5n01/ff-v5n014501-the-cost-of-college-student-loan-debt.aspx
[https://perma.cc/8HYG-ZNWK].
292. Up to 40% of low-income students who are accepted to college do not end up matriculating
because “[t]hey’re stymied by tuition sticker shock, Kafkaesque paperwork requirements and a quiet,
corrosive feeling that they don’t belong.” Meredith Kolodner, Why Are Low-Income Students Not
Showing Up to College, Even Though They Have Been Accepted?, HECHINGER REP. (Aug. 14, 2015),
http://hechingerreport.org/why-are-low-income-students-not-showing-up-to-college-even-thoughthey-have-been-accepted/ [https://perma.cc/VA77-QGEC].
293. Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Emmanuel Saez, Nicholas Turner & Danny Yagan, Mobility
Report Cards: The Role of Colleges in Intergenerational Mobility (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 23618, 2017).
294. Arnold Kling, Education, Assortative Mating, and Inequality, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY:
ECONLOG (Mar. 26, 2008), http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2008/03/education_and_i_1.html
[https://perma.cc/8UE9-T2AJ].

The Marital Wealth Gap final

152

3/11/2018 12:11 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:xxx

be more attractive to you.”295 Then, as Kling suggests, the institution of
college “explains rising inequality,” for the exorbitant tuition serves as a
barrier for lower-income students to attend, resulting in colleges’ being
populated predominately by students from wealthier backgrounds. This,
in turn, encourages homogenous mating among higher-income students
who meet at college or who meet elsewhere but are attracted to one
another due to their shared education backgrounds.296
In a similar context, scholars recognized that the connection between
physical spaces, social policy, and urban design, on the one hand, and
family lives, on the other hand, is crucial in its impact on families’ wellbeing.297 These physical and economic realities make it harder for
individuals from different classes to meet in the areas that constitute the
main arenas for forming intimate relationships. These structures therefore
cultivate socioeconomic inbreeding, which contributes to the marital
wealth gap.
In conclusion, marriage is often an instrument for wealth aggregation.
Besides economies of scale and the behavior of married couples, a host of
rules that prefer married couples in wealth amassment are conducive to
the existence and growth of the marital wealth gap. Positive patterns of
assortative mating also contribute to this amassment of wealth. The legal
and social architectures that compose the primary venues in which people
meet people from other strata are gradually becoming more
socioeconomically segregated. The next Part considers potential
theoretical foundations for guiding the creation of remedies to these
problems.
IV. A NEW THEORY OF MARRIAGE’S ROLE IN WEALTH
INEQUALITY
This Part introduces a few theoretical principles for narrowing the
marital wealth gap. Two important caveats follow. First, the marital
wealth gap is only one strand of the tangle that constitutes wealth
inequality.298 Restructuring rules that support the marital wealth gap will
only be one step in combating wealth inequality. Other scholars have

295. Id.
296. Id. (“It explains why education is highly correlated with income . . . [for] [g]oing to college
increases your chances of landing a high-income spouse.”).
297. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 180–85 (showing how urban design impacts the
creation of positive relationships among family members).
298. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 21 , at 2 (“[T]he American tax system [pertaining to families]
is a significant cause of these problems.” (emphasis added and omitted)).
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offered analyses of further structural changes required to close the wealth
gap.299 The suggestions set forth below are limited to the intersection of
partner selection and household structure with wealth concentration.
Second, a plan to eliminate preferential treatment of marital status—as
related to wealth holding—entails a complicated set of considerations
ranging from the political feasibility of such plans to the administrative
difficulties attached to taxing families.300 Scholars have put forward
multiple proposals addressing such issues, and sketching such a detailed
plan exceeds the scope of this Article. This Part outlines the broad
theoretical contours of what such reforms involve but does not endorse
any particular plan. Put differently, the Article does not aim to close the
conversation but rather to deepen it.
A.

Sorting Approaches for Change

So far, the Article has recognized several shortcomings concerning
wealth inequality and family law. These shortcomings may be framed as
follows.
The system is underinclusive: The rules governing wealth accumulation
and retention provide benefits to married couples that are not available to
other types of relationships, such as unmarried couples and nonconjugal
ones.301 In section III.C, the Article details how various legal directives
favor married couples over single people and unmarried couples.302 As
noted earlier, while married couples benefit from tax-free intraspousal
transfers and portability—as well as benefits in retirement savings and
taxation of capital gains from the sale of a primary residence—individuals
in nonmarital relationships cannot use them.
Wealth benefits to those who already own more: In The Supportive
State, Maxine Eichner argues that “the state would have little justification
for funneling general economic support to those in adult-adult
relationships, given that these adults, on average, do better financially due
299. See, e.g., id. at 82–90 (proposing a comprehensive plan to tax wealth); CHANG, supra note 22,
at 117–42 (suggesting policies to combat the gender wealth gap).
300. On the feasibility of plans to change taxation of married couples, see, e.g., Crawford, supra
note 221, at 63; Infanti, supra note 214, at 621 (“The adoption of an individual tax filing system in
the United States is not as politically unrealistic as other commentators believe.”). For discussion of
the administrative problems in taxing the marital unit, see, e.g., Moore, supra note 148, at 290
(discussing the principles of simplicity of a taxation system).
301. Bridget J. Crawford, Valuation, Values, Norms: Proposals for Estate and Gift Tax Reform, 57
B.C. L. REV. 979, 993–94 (2016) (“Commentators also have critiqued the economic unity rationale
for granting certain privileges to married couples, explaining that the benefit is both too broad . . . and
too narrow . . . .”).
302. Supra notes 149–235.
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to the economies of scale of living together.”303 Not only, as Eichner
points out, do married couples fare better financially than other families,
but marital status also becomes more financially advantageous the richer
the couple is.304 Marriage is increasingly the preserve of those who are
already better off, and yet the state attaches benefits that support
concentration of wealth within affluent married households.305 As people
increasingly marry others who share their own socioeconomic status, the
justifications for bestowing such benefits weaken.
Norms of privatization encourage families to keep wealth in the family:
As Eichner further warns, “The state’s support of family ties runs the risk
that closer family bonds will lead to wealth being held within families and
therefore to the increased disparities of wealth and opportunities across
families.”306 As this Article shows in section III.C, the norms of
privatization and rules related to inheritance and estate taxation often
motivate families, especially married households, to create more wealth
and to keep it to themselves.307
Legal structures that create conditions that encourage assortative
mating: In section III.D, this Article demonstrates that increased instances
of marriage among persons from similar stratum are another contributor
to the marital wealth gap.
Scholars of various fields, but mainly tax law scholars, have suggested
various methods to address these shortcomings. In what follows, the
Article divides their suggestions into three groups in order to assess which
approach will solve the above-mentioned problems; it has also developed
a fourth category, concerning the structural barriers that maintain
assortative mating. The categories are: (1) combating the
underinclusiveness of laws governing wealth accumulation; (2)
implementing marriage neutrality; (3) encouraging altruism; and (4)
reducing wealth-based assortative mating.
These categories are not mutually exclusive, in the sense that
advocating for a particular position does not necessarily contradict
supporting one of the other categories. In addition, because the proposals
303. EICHNER, supra note 235, at 107.
304. Cf. Infanti, supra note 214, at 644 (“The estate and gift taxes may impose a hefty levy on such
transfers; however, in the context of the traditional family, these taxes only apply to an exceedingly
small slice of very wealthy transferors, who can still benefit from special rules that look to the
existence of familial relationships when either reducing or deferring tax.”).
305. Leong, supra note 13, at 1336 (“Marriage has become the province of the educated and
wealthy. It has become a mechanism by which these privileged individuals perpetuate their privilege
across generations.”).
306. EICHNER, supra note 235, at 102.
307. See supra notes 182–207.
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incorporated in each category derive from scholars in separate legal fields,
who often work in silos, those proposals frequently address only one
aspect related to wealth holding and the family at a time. Thus, no single
proposal considers all aspects of wealth benefits and their connection to
relationships together. To address such fragmentation, the Article also
envisions additional proposals appropriate to each category.
Combating the underinclusiveness of laws governing wealth
accumulation: This category includes strategies intended to reduce the
special status of marriage by breaking down marriage’s monopoly on taxfree wealth transfers and distribution of wealth escalators.308 This
approach assembles proposals advocating that wealth-transfer benefits,
granted mainly to married couples, should be extended to other types of
families.309 Shari Motro, for instance, suggests that benefits from income
splitting, including double estate and gift tax exclusions, should be
restricted to married couples who are economically interdependent (i.e.,
those who pool their incomes and properties). Couples who do not
function as one economic unit, such as couples who entered into a
prenuptial agreement that restricts the sharing of assets between the
couple, should not enjoy the benefits of income splitting. Simultaneously,
laws would bestow these benefits on economically interdependent couples
who are not married, including nonintimate couples.310
By the same token, this approach could suggest that unmarried couples
should use portability the same way married couples do.311 And, similarly,
a single person should be entitled to designate someone (with whom that
person is economically interdependent) who could exclude from the estate
tax the unused applicable-exclusion amount of a deceased partner.
308. In a thought experiment, Bridget Crawford contemplates “an ultra-autonomous approach” to
taxation wealth transfers, under which each individual could share the tax exemption with another
person or persons of the individual’s choice—not necessarily a spouse. Such a regime “would allow
each taxpayer to freely transfer his or her applicable exclusion to anyone at all, without regard to the
existence of a marital relationship.” Crawford, supra note 294, at 995. Crawford concludes that such
a regime would result in a revenue loss to the government, and thus “it is fiscally and politically
unrealistic that the law would move in that direction.” Id. at 996.
309. Cf. Theodore P. Seto, A Coasean Theory of Marriage (Loyola Law Sch. Legal Studies Paper
No. 2014–20, 2014), at 12, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2424563
[https://perma.cc/U37S-99QT ] (“[T]he property and contractual aspects of the law of marriage
should be structured to maximize the legal security of welfare-enhancing exchanges and transfers
between spouses.”).
310. Shari Motro, A New “I Do”: Towards A Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV.
1509, 1513 (2006) (“Thus, I propose that tax law consider individuals’ legally binding economic
status independent of their marital status, and that only couples committed to sharing all taxable
income equally should be treated as such for tax purposes.”).
311. To clarify, I am unaware of such existing proposals—rather, I envision what the proposals
that fall under this group would look like.
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Likewise, according to this rationale, any person who shows economic
interdependence with another should be eligible to transfer assets without
incurring tax consequences, regardless of marital status. This arrangement
would likely support maintaining the exclusion for the sale of a principal
residence, because it applies also to unmarried couples, but would insist
that only couples (married or otherwise) who are economically
interdependent could use it. It would also enable using the capital gains
exclusion even if unmarried partners do not hold title as co-owners, as the
current regulations require.312
Toward marriage neutrality: Under this approach I categorize
proposals that advocate marriage neutrality.313 These proposals reflect the
principle that marital status should not be a factor that contributes to
wealth amassing. They advocate decoupling marriage from some wealth
benefits, or reducing the preferential status of marriage. The outcome of
this approach is to reduce wealth consolidation among married couples.
Much of the focus in this group of proposals is on changing distortion in
the system of income tax (the advantages of joint taxation to some married
couples), which is outside the scope of this Article.314 Some scholarship
more relevant to our purpose, however, explicitly tackles the wealth
benefits attendant to marriage.315
312. The proposals in this category are incomplete in that they do not address other dimensions that
provide preferential benefits to marital households that result in wealth concentration. For example, I
am unaware of any suggestion regarding how to eliminate discrimination against unmarried couples
in the retirement savings system. See generally BELLA DEPAULO, SINGLED OUT: HOW SINGLES ARE
STEREOTYPED, STIGMATIZED, AND IGNORED, AND STILL LIVE HAPPILY EVER AFTER (2006)
(discussing how the Social Security system discriminates against singles). However, in speculating
about what such proposals would look like, we can conjecture that they would advocate a system in
which family status is irrelevant—and that, rather, they would consider only the function of
relationships. Such a system is akin to what Nancy Polikoff calls a “valuing all families” approach.
Polikoff advocates that families be recognized by their function rather than by marriage or by any
status. NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES
UNDER THE LAW 125–29 (2008).
313. Cf. Yair Listokin, Taxation and Marriage: A Reappraisal, 67 TAX L. REV. 185, 185 (2014)
(“Proponents of marriage neutrality, by contrast, contest the notion that married couples are a single
unit and abhor the marriage penalties and marriage bonuses that follow from a progressive income
tax with couples equity.”).
314. Several tax law scholars have criticized the joint filing aspects of tax in the United States and
suggested a move to an individual filing system, including in the system of wealth transfers. See, e.g.,
Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 651, 683–84 (2010); Martha T. McCluskey, Taxing the Family Work: Aid for Affluent Husband
Care, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 109, 198 (2011) (arguing that joint filing provides unfair benefits
to married couples and advocating shifting to an individual filing system).
315. For other relevant proposals, see Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the Qtip Trust
and the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N.C. L. REV 1729, 1748 (1998) (“For estate tax purposes,
the unlimited marital deduction should be replaced by an estate-equalization limitation.”); James M.
Puckett, Rethinking Tax Priorities: Marriage Neutrality, Children, and Contemporary Families, 78
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Bridget Crawford suggests eliminating the marital deduction to make
gratuitous wealth transfers between spouses fully taxable.316 The result,
she argues, is increased tax revenues and reduced administrative costs
related to the collection of estate and gift taxes. She contends that such a
plan is generally more consistent with an approach that treats all types of
relationships equally. Anthony Infanti presents a comprehensive plan to
switch the United States tax system from joint filing to single filing, which
“decentralizes” the special benefits that the traditional family structure
receives under the current system.317 Building, in part, on the model of the
Canadian tax system, Infanti offers a scheme of individual filing that treats
all economically interdependent relationships equally. When it comes to
taxation of wealth transfer among partners, like Crawford, he suggests
repealing the estate and gift tax marital deductions.318
Although combating the inclusiveness aspect (proposed by Motro) and
advocating for marriage neutrality (espoused by Crawford and Infanti)
advance similar goals—that is, recognizing relationships other than
marriage—they use different strategies. Motro’s approach would
maintain a system of income splitting but would be more selective in
terms of who gets to use it. Crawford and Infanti, on the other hand,
suggest fighting noninclusiveness by dismantling the structural problem,
by switching to a system of individual filing, or by repealing the marital
deduction.
Similarly, Lily Kahng explores the evolution of tax rules for capital
gains on the sale of one’s primary residence and the rules’ impact on
different taxpayers. She finds that “these subsidies for home sales
rest upon questionable policy justifications, flawed logical reasoning, and
poor design choices.”319 She thus suggests repealing the capital gains
exclusion on a principal residence and treating gains on home sales in the
same manner as all other types of capital gains.320 While this proposal
does not address marriage neutrality explicitly, the repeal of the special
treatment for taxation of gains from the sale of residences also means the
cancellation of the double exclusion for married couples.
Encouraging altruism: The third group of proposals is advanced by
U. CIN. L REV. 1409, 1434 (2010) (“The joint return (and special rates for married taxpayers) should
be abolished as an incoherent penalty and subsidy of marriage. Joint filing is indefensible as a
component of a progressive tax system.”).
316. Crawford, supra note 196, at 797–805.
317. Infanti, supra note 214, at 67.
318. Id. at 656.
319. Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales, supra note 83, at 189.
320. Id. at 236–37.
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scholars who worry that norms of close family connections incentivize
family members to keep wealth within the family. Consequently, these
proposals suggest that the state should create mechanisms for
incentivizing transfers of wealth outside the family. For instance, Eichner
suggests that the state should encourage wealth transfer outside affluent
families, such as tax incentives for charitable giving.321 Mark L. Ascher
argues that the state should adopt a deduction for donations to charities as
a means to encourage philanthropy. In his words, “Given the incentives
for lifetime giving that reallocation at death would create, the allowance
of a gift tax charitable deduction would surely result in a marked increase
in lifetime charitable giving.”322
In fact, such incentives already exist: the tax code allows, in certain
circumstances, the deduction of charitable contributions from income
tax.323 And there is also an estate tax charitable deduction, allowing a free
transfer to charities from estates.324
Reducing wealth-based assortative mating: This category incorporates
the author’s own thought experiment, with two rationales. First, if
marriage is a concentrator of wealth, it can also serve as a wealth
redistributor in the same way that socially conservative scholars advocate
promoting marriage as a means to reduce poverty.325 It is not a new idea
that marriage can help redistribute wealth downward by breaking up the
concentration of wealth and creating opportunities for upward

321. EICHNER, supra note 235, at 108. In a similar vein, Bill Gates recently noted, “Philanthropy
also can be an important part of the solution set. It’s too bad that Piketty devotes so little space to
it . . . . Philanthropy done well not only produces direct benefits for society, it also reduces dynastic
wealth.” See Bill Gates, Why Inequality Matters, GATES NOTES (Oct. 13, 2014),
https://www.gatesnotes.com/Books/Why-Inequality-Matters-Capital-in-21st-Century-Review
[https://perma.cc/F988-H2PG].
322. Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 98–99 (1990).
323. See I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 2055(a), 2522(a) (2012).
324. Id. §§ 2501–2524.
325. The notion that an increase in marriage rates can substitute for legal measures to promote
income equalization has loomed large among socially conservative commentators. In a 2015 report
titled Strong Families, Prosperous States, W. Bradford Wilcox, Joseph Price, and Robert Lerman
argue that “[h]igher levels of marriage, and especially higher levels of married-parent families, are
strongly associated with more economic growth, more economic mobility, less child poverty, and
higher median family income at the state level in the United States.” WILCOX, PRICE, & LERMAN,
supra note 108, at 3. As Senator Marco Rubio put it, marriage is “the greatest tool to lift children and
families from poverty.” Annie Lowery, Can Marriage Cure Poverty?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 4.,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/magazine/can-marriage-cure-poverty.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/JJW4-P4C2]. Brad Wilcox and Bob Lerman thus suggest that, to overcome
economic inequality, the state should take measures to increase marriage rates. Wilcox & Lerman,
supra note 16. Such measures include launching a national campaign to encourage marriage and
eliminate marriage penalties. Id.
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socioeconomic mobility. For instance, as early as the end of the fourth
century, the Catholic Church began to prohibit marriage between
cousins.326 The reasons for the prohibition are complex, but one
hypothesis is that the Church aimed to break “the continuity of European
family estates and maneuver[] property into the church.”327 In this early
example, lawmakers regulated marriage and relationships in a way that
transferred wealth from a few families to others, including to the Church
itself, thus preventing wealth from remaining in the family. In the United
States, the prohibition against cousin marriage emerged in the second half
of the nineteenth century. While much of the reasoning and debate about
banning first-cousin marriage focused on eugenic arguments,
anthropologists suggest that the ban also sprang from the desire to have
immigrants assimilate (by marrying outside their groups), as well as from
a reaction against the elite’s consolidation of wealth through
consanguineous marriages.328
Second, the state can try to eliminate the schemas that stand in the way
of cross-class meetings, since, as stated before, assortative mating is at
least partly a result of assortative meeting. Of course, beyond its interest
in increasing instances of meetings between people from different
socioeconomic strata, the state has many other excellent reasons to fight
these trends of segregation.329
The next section evaluates which of the above approaches would help
design a family law paradigm that mitigates the concentration of wealth
among married couples.
B.

Transformative Redistribution and Recognition as a Paradigm

This section provides a theoretical basis to assess which of the
mentioned approaches would resolve the problems identified above. This
Article achieves this by uncovering the proposals’ normative
implications, focusing on the harms they would fix. To this end, it relies
on the analytical categories that critical theorist Nancy Fraser presents in
her work on claims for “recognition” versus “redistribution” and on
“affirmative” versus “transformative” remedies.

326. MARTIN OTTENHEIMER, FORBIDDEN RELATIVES: THE AMERICAN MYTH OF COUSIN
MARRIAGE 63 (1996).
327. Id. at 68.
328. Id. at 152–53.
329. See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, Why Economic School Segregation Matters, NYU FURMAN
CTR. (Mar. 2014), http://furmancenter.org/research/iri/essay/why-economic-school-segregationmatters [https://perma.cc/VFC9-9ACD].
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In a number of articles and books, Fraser puts forth a theory of social
justice that serves as a normative baseline for the question of which
struggles for justice are equitable.330 Her intervention is in parsing the
differences between claims aiming to fight cultural misrecognition
(demand for recognition of differences, typically “under the banners of
nationality, ethnicity, ‘race’, gender, and sexuality”) versus claims to fight
socioeconomic injustice.331 Claims for redistribution are grounded in
efforts to abolish the class differences that arise from an unjust political
economy. Conversely, cultural recognition struggles can either advocate
for the celebration of differences or for the deconstruction of
differences.332 Fraser contends that contemporary politics have often
focused on eliminating cultural misrecognition, to the neglect of claims
about maldistribution of resources.333 The rise of the politics of
recognition, Fraser observes, has eclipsed the previously dominant
politics of redistribution, which sought to remedy socioeconomic
injustices through the fair distribution of resources.334
In addition, Fraser makes a useful distinction between the types of
remedies that individuals and groups have advocated as a means to fix
these dual prongs of injustice. Accordingly, she distinguishes between
affirmative strategies and transformative strategies, where affirmative
strategies are “remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes of
social arrangements without disturbing the underlying framework that
generates them,”335 and transformative remedies “mean remedies aimed
at correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the
underlying generative framework.”336 Transformative remedies are those
that remake the legal structure and dismantle the architecture that embeds
the harm. Strategies of affirmative recognition, in contrast, are more
focused on fixing the current problem; they bandage an injury without
addressing the source of the injury itself. Fraser’s central claim is that
transformative remedies to redress misrecognition do not contradict
transformative remedies to redress economic injustice. The contrary is
true: the combination of transformative recognition and redistribution
330. See, e.g., NANCY FRASER, SCALES OF JUSTICE: REIMAGINING POLITICAL SPACE IN A
GLOBALIZING WORLD (2009).
331. See Fraser, supra note 20, at 68.
332. FRASER, supra note 330, at 18, 49–51.
333. See Fraser, supra note 20, at 68, 70–74 (“[G]roup identity supplants class interest as the chief
medium of political mobilization.”).
334. See id.
335. Id. at 82.
336. Id.
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constitute “folk paradigms of justice”—linked elements that (should)
inform struggles for social justice.337
These paradigms are valuable in evaluating the categories discussed
above. In the case of family law and wealth inequality, the misrecognition
(cultural) aspect stems from the special status given to marriage
simultaneously with privation of recognition of other relationships. The
distributional aspect is the overconcentration of wealth in married
households in the top 10%, including the top 1%, and particularly the
effect of diverse legal directives and norms on such concentration.
Categorizing the approaches for solving the problem under the categories
of “recognition and redistribution” and of “affirmative versus
transformative” provides an analytical tool for assessing which proposals
fix only one paradigm and which can address both. Table 3, below, shows
the classifications.338
Table 3:
Analytical Paradigms

Redistribution

Recognition

Affirmative
Encouraging
altruism
Combating
underinclusiveness

Transformative
Reducing wealthbased assortative
mating
Marriage
neutrality

Combating underinclusiveness is an approach most apposite to the
category of “affirmative recognition.” This approach, which aspires to
solve the problem of the preferential treatment of married couples and the
misrecognition of other select groups of couples, is fundamentally
grounded in recognition of other types of families. The problem with such
an approach is that, although it formally equalizes treatments for different
types of relationships, it still contributes to the amassing of wealth in the
hands of a few better-off individuals, ignoring the larger socioeconomic
maldistribution. That is, even if a larger portion of the population can use
wealth benefits and escalators, there still exists the problem of the
concentration of wealth among a small number of affluent families.
337. NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? A POLITICALPHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 11 (Joel Golb et al. trans., 2003) (“[I]n their political reference. . . . the
terms ‘redistribution’ and ‘recognition’ refer not to philosophical paradigms but rather to folk
paradigms of justice, which inform present-day struggles in civil society.”).
338. Cf. Fraser, supra note 20, at 87.
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Eventually, even if singles and unmarried couples become entitled to
transfer more wealth among themselves—in the same way as married
couples can—they will likely transfer it to people who are from relatively
similar economic strata (e.g., their children, friends, or siblings). In fact,
studies show that nonmarried couples also tend to pair with people from
similar socioeconomic and educational backgrounds.339 The outcome is
that recognition of more family types for purposes of wealth benefits does
not solve the problem of concentration. It simply allows additional
wealthy individuals to enjoy the legal structures that permit wealth
retention within the family, albeit more diverse types of families.
Moreover, the types of estate and gift tax benefits available to married
couples already apply to those who, jointly, have more than $11 million
in their estate. Data show that the median net worth of people sixty-five
years and older in the fifth quintile of wealth in the United States in 2011
(which represents the top 10% of United States residents) was
$899,608.340 In 2013, only 10,568 decedents filed federal estate tax
returns.341 This means that equalizing the tax benefits of marriage to other
households will only assist a small percentage of unmarried individuals
who are very wealthy.
Even if we fix other inequalities, such as the preferential treatment of
married couples in retirement plans, by extending the benefits to singles
and unmarried couples, we still do not solve the fundamental structural
inequality: family support as a pillar of privatization. One structural
problem with retirement saving is what political scientist Philipp Rehm
calls the “privatization of social policy risks.”342 Rehm points out that, in
most rich democracies, there has been a shift from a system of definedbenefit pension plans to a system based mainly on defined-contribution
plans (such as 401[k]s and IRAs). And the more that the latter become
popular, the more they become necessary to maintain a reasonable

339. See, e.g., Debra L. Blackwell & Daniel T. Lichter, Homogamy Among Dating, Cohabiting,
and Married Couples, 45 SOC. Q. 719, 732 (2004) (concluding that, overall, “the rather stringent
sorting criteria that men and women use in selecting a marital partner, which manifests itself in marital
homogamy, is also used in dating and cohabiting relationships”); Christine R. Schwartz, Trends and
Variation in Assortative Mating: Causes and Consequences, 39 ANN. REV. SOC.451, 459 (2013)
(“These findings suggest that increases in cohabitation have not substantially altered trends in
assortative mating, at least in the United States.”).
340. Vornovitsky et al., supra note 73 at 1, 7 tbl.A1.
341. SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Statistics Filing Year Table 1, supra note 98 (click link to table for
2013).
342. PHILIPP REHM, RISK INEQUALITY AND WELFARE STATES: SOCIAL POLICY PREFERENCES,
DEVELOPMENT, AND DYNAMICS 201 (2016).
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standard of living after retirement.343 This shift, Rehm argues, “stealthily
contributes to wealth inequality” because defined-contribution plans are
savings that are transferred to the next generation upon death of the
beneficiary (unlike traditional pensions that expire with the death of the
recipient).344 The outcome is that more wealth is being transferred to the
next generation. In his words,
“[I]f one wants to retire comfortably, one accidentally will make
one’s offspring rich in the process. The inherited wealth may well
be significant enough for the offspring to pay itself a private and
fairly generous monthly stipend (‘private basic income’) to
sustain a middleclass level of living, without participating in the
labor market.”345
So, while incentivizing more people to save for retirement and ending
discrimination against singles are important goals, the result may again be
the transfer of more wealth to the next generation without fixing the
underlying cause of wealth inequality.
Solving the inclusiveness aspect does not change the systematic
problem that relationship status confers benefits on wealthy couples and
entrenches norms of privatization of support. In fact, it can result in an
expanded group of people who use tax exemptions and benefits, and
thereby reduce state revenue. As Patricia Cain points out in a similar
context, “Thus, to extend a flawed provision to unmarried couples might
create formal equality; but it would not further substantive justice.”346
Encouraging altruism advances a redistributive goal, but it is not
transformative. It remedies economic injustice because it creates
incentives to redistribute outside the family. There are several questions
about how efficient such mechanisms are in reducing wealth amassment.
Critiques abound concerning the current system of encouraging charitable
contributions.347 In short, scholars argue that this tax deduction provides
more subsidies to wealthier individuals than to the poor, who can give
only a smaller proportion of their wealth away, and that individuals can
contribute to purposes that do not serve the public interest (e.g., golf clubs;
foundations that their offspring control).348 These critiques, as well as the
343. Id. at 211.
344. Id. at 210–11.
345. Id.
346. Patricia A. Cain, Death Taxes: A Critique from the Margin, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 677, 702
(2000).
347. See Brian L. Frye, Solving Charity Failures, 93 OR. L. REV. 155, 169–170 (2014) (surveying
the different critiques on encouraging charitable contributions).
348. Id. at 169–171.
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various suggestions on how to solve this problem, are beyond the scope
of this Article. For our purpose, suffice it to note that the current system
is problematic because it does not result in breaking up concentration of
wealth. Indeed, a recent report indicates that mechanisms to encourage
altruism yield limited success. A 2014 Family Wealth Transfers Report
from researchers at Wealth-X shows that members of United States
families with ultra-high net worth are expected to pass on $6 trillion at
death over the next three decades.349 But only $170 billion of these
fortunes––or about .028%—are estimated to be philanthropic bequests.350
Finally, this approach is not transformative because it does not prevent
the overconcentration to begin with. Even assuming that encouraging
people to give away some of their wealth is effective, this still does not
combat the fundamental moral and societal problems of wide gaps in
wealth holding. A truly transformative approach should tackle the
concentration via marriage, not just find ways to redistribute it after it is
amassed. Moreover, a system that relies on encouraging altruism does not
remedy the structural problems embedded in the distribution of wealth
because it does not address the other pillars of privatization that signal
married couples to keep wealth in the family.
Marriage neutrality advances transformative recognition of families,
and, to a lesser extent, promotes redistributive ends. This approach aims
to decouple some of the wealth benefits attendant to marital status and to
reduce the preferential treatment of married couples. The basic rationale
is that married couples already do better in terms of wealth accumulation,
so there is no reason for the state to bestow further benefits on them.
Rather than extending existing benefits to others, the state should—when
fair—treat relationships neutrally, regardless of status. This arrangement
is grounded in a cultural recognition claim because its other purpose is to
promote various, nontraditional families. It fights misrecognition because
it does not single out marriage for special treatment. Rather, it looks
functionally for those relationships that create interdependency and, thus,
should be entitled to legal recognition. In this way, all relationships are
evaluated by their function and not by their status. This approach is also
redistributive because, eventually, it will curtail some of the wealth
aggregation by married households. That is, these proposals strive to
transfer more revenue to the state—which should, at least in theory, use it
to provide more benefits to society.
349. WEALTH-X, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSFERS REPORT 26 (2014), http://www.wealthx.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/WealthX_NFP_FamilyWealthTransfersReport-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y8FZ-FBQW].
350. Id. at 30.
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Finally, this approach is transformative because it deals with the roots
of the problem, “restructuring the underlying generative framework,”
rather than promoting a change that leaves the current structure as is.351
For instance, Khang’s proposal to repeal the exclusion of capital gains
from the sale of a primary residence and treat it as any other capital gains
is transformative because, as she shows, this exclusion is not an effective
way to encourage homeownership.352 This proposal does not advocate
allowing more couples to enjoy it. It suggests an approach that recognizes
all families and individuals and, at the same time, fixes a problem of
political economy. More generally, changing the architecture requires, for
our purpose, plans that end the preferential treatment of marriage,
effectively tax the transfer of great wealth within families, and fix the
infrastructures that cause some families to be unable to save.353
Reducing wealth-based assortative mating has elements of cultural and
redistributive paradigms and can be transformative or affirmative. In its
thin version, the state will try to encourage marriage between people from
different socioeconomic backgrounds. The thin version is not only
ineffective but also affirmative (not transformative). Theoretically, to
fight the concentration of wealth through marriage the state can use
legislation. Just as certain relatives are banned from marrying each other,
the state could, hypothetically, ban people with a certain high level of
wealth from marrying their counterparts.354 The state, to be sure, cannot
351. Cf. Fraser, supra note 20, at 82.
352. Khang, supra note 83, at 237 (“Moreover, based on our recent experience with the housing
market and its particularly adverse impacts on minority homeowners and communities, we must
reevaluate how the government can more effectively promote equality and prosperity.”).
353. Other possible reforms include, in the area of retirement savings, not only ending the
preferential treatment of married couples but also acknowledging that some individuals encounter
structural impediments in saving for retirement. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Advisory Council
Report on Disparities for Women and Minorities in Retirement Savings (2010),
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-council/disparities-forwomen-and-minorities-in-retirement-savings [https://perma.cc/CDP4-5CWG] (reporting that women
and workers of ethnic minorities, in both the public and private sectors, struggle to save ample
retirement funds). One problem is that women who decrease their participation in the labor force
when giving birth and serving as the primary caregiver generally have a harder time saving for
retirement. Chang, supra note 37, at 65–68. Because retirement plans depend on the years the
beneficiary had in the paid workforce, that person’s earnings, and whether that person worked full
time, women are often thrown off one of the main wealth escalators (retirement savings). A
transformative remedy will not aim to repair this problem by increasing eligibility based on the other
partner’s savings. There are several suggestions for rectifying this problem using structure-based
changes. Id. at 125–39.
354. As a thought experiment, contemplating a list of measures that the state should not adopt in
trying to discourage intimate discrimination in the contexts of race or disability, Elizabeth Emens
suggests the state can create a regime in which only mixed race or mixed disability marriages were
allowed. This is, as Emens clarifies, absurd and “[n]obody, of course, would actually advocate a law
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and should not adopt suchf ban because it infringes on individual liberty
and autonomy in a way that contradicts fundamental principles of a liberal
state.355 A softer version of lawmaking that could potentially reduce
marriage rates between wealthy families is to give tax benefits for
individuals who marry into very different economic ranks.356 But such
regulation, while it may encourage a socially good purpose, would also
infringe too much on personal autonomy.357 Suggesting that the state
needs to pay rich people in order to marry those who are less well off, or
to pay poor people to marry richer people, would stigmatize the rich and
the poor.358 In any event, it is doubtful how effective such tax incentives
would be.
In a more reasonable version of this approach, because marriage
selection is a source of enduring wealth inequality, the state could be
justified in creating conditions for further social integration that might
result in a more heterogeneous marriage market. If “[a] vigorous liberal
democracy should be able to privilege some relationships over others for
important public ends,”359 then it can also adopt policies that encourage
some types of relationships over others.
For example, because school settings, including higher education,
constitute one of the most significant partnership markets,360 the state
could adopt measures to diversify school attendance. Correspondingly,
the state could take measures to decrease residential economic-based
segregation. Proposals for how it could do these things—increase school
heterogeneity, decrease higher education costs to increase heterogeneity,
and reduce the number of economic-based segregated neighborhoods—
abound, and exceed the scope of this Article.361 The state has various other
that so patently impinges on individual liberty and autonomy.” Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate
Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1382–
83 (2009).
355. Cf. id.; EICHNER, supra note 227, at 104 (“Liberalism’s great respect for individual autonomy
requires that the state give individuals the freedom to engage or not engage in consensual relationships
with others as they choose.”).
356. Here also this Article builds on Emens’s list of things the state should not do in order to
encourage marriages between people of mixed races or when one spouse has a disability. Emens,
supra note 344, at 1385–36.
357. Cf. id. at 1356 (“To impinge on people’s individual preferences in the intimate domain would
seem a gross imposition on personal autonomy, in the absence of a substantial showing of
countervailing harm.”).
358. Cf. id. at 1385 (concluding that tax benefits to encourage marriage with people with disabilities
can stigmatize people with disabilities).
359. EICHNER, supra note 227, at 112.
360. Kalmijn & Flap, supra note 264.
361. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION:
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compelling reasons to fight socioeconomic segregation; contesting
wealth-based assortative mating serves as an additional justification for
adopting such proposals.
This approach can be transformative or not, depending on its
effectiveness and, more important, its aim. Even if the state takes steps to
increase the supply side of mate selection, this will likely still yield limited
results. Even in integrated settings, individuals are often attracted to
people with traits similar to theirs.362 In addition, studies show that class
sensibilities are sticky: giving people from different classes more
opportunities to interact does not mean that they will get along, as it is
tough to change cultural norms and intimate preferences.363 Further,
individuals increasingly meet more through virtual matchmaking apps, a
trend that, perhaps counterintuitively, entrenches patterns of assortative
mating.364 It may be that the degree of assortative mating in online dating
is less than in a physical-meeting context;365 still, most studies show that
assortative mating is persistent in online matchmaking websites.366
Moreover, creating policies that affect mate selection in the virtual world
is even more challenging than creating them in other arenas.367

SOCIOECONOMIC DIVERSITY AS AN EDUCATION REFORM STRATEGY 309–11 (2012); LeighAnn M.
Smith, Affirmatively Further Fair Housing—and Potentially Further Fair Schooling, 24 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 329, 331 (2015) (discussing the connection between
housing policy, economic segregation, and diversity in schools).
362. Debra Blackwell & Daniel T. Lichter, Homogamy Among Married, Dating, and Cohabiting
Couples, 45 SOC. Q. 719, 720–21 (2004) (“Even in culturally diverse settings, individuals often make
themselves available for dating and ultimately for cohabitation and marriage primarily to persons with
similar and easily observable traits (e.g., racial characteristics).”).
363. In her study of thirty-two “different-origin” middle-class married couples consisting of one
blue-collar-raised and one white-collar-raised spouse, Jessi Streib demonstrated that class upbringing
embeds values and traits that typically endure into adulthood. This held true even when, as was the
case for all of Streib’s couples, both partners had achieved middle-class status when they met. Streib
calls the ingrained values and traits “sensibilities,” which encompass finance management,
relationship to employment, leisure habits, spontaneity, parenting style, and emotional expression.
JESSI STREIB, THE POWER OF THE PAST: UNDERSTANDING CROSS-CLASS MARRIAGES (2015).
364. Cf., e.g., Schwartz, supra note 339, at 458 (“This suggests that matches formed through the
internet may not differ substantially from those formed in other ways, but research on how technology
changes the nature of marriage markets and romantic relationships is in its infancy.”).
365. Gina Potarca, Does the Internet Affect Assortative Mating? Evidence from the U.S. and
Germany, 61 SOC. SCI. RES. 278, 278 (2017) (“Internet promotes weaker couple endogamy compared
to conventional contexts typically known to foster endogamy, such as school, family, friends, or
religious venues.”).
366. Kevin Lewis, The Limits of Racial Prejudice, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 18,814,
18,814–19 (2013); Ken-Hou Lin and Jennifer Lundquist, Mate Selection in Cyberspace: The
Intersection of Race, Gender, and Education, 119 AM. J. SOC. 183, 183–215.
367. For a discussion of the challenges and possible solutions of combating structural
discrimination in online websites, see Russell K. Robinson, Structural Dimensions of Romantic
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But the biggest weakness of fighting assortative marriage as a means
to reduce inequality is not its level of effectiveness. Rather, while
integration is an important cause in and of itself, it is a method that, once
again, relies on marriage as a vehicle for change. As such, it is grounded
in notions of privatization rather than in concrete state regulation that will
combat the amassment of wealth. For too long, marriage has been the
primary mechanism advocated to remedy economic inequality.368 Such a
stratagem leaves the important problems of wealth inequality to the
domain of private choice; it will advance some equalization of wealth but
will not attack the structures that help maintain the marital wealth gap.
Hence, this approach is only transformative to the extent that it is part of
a larger project to combat socioeconomic segregation rather than as a
primary weapon to fight economic justice via marriage.
In conclusion, the Article does not propose a unified, detailed plan for
transformative recognition and redistribution. Its aim is to point out that
addressing only distributive injustice or only cultural harm will likely
yield inequitable or inadequate results. The proposals mentioned under
the categories of “toward marriage neutrality,” and possibly some
versions of fighting socioeconomic segregation, are good steps in this
direction.
To clarify, this approach does not advocate eliminating all rights and
benefits attendant to the status of being married—only those that are
disproportionately benefiting married couples (discussed in section III.C).
Some might be concerned that such reforms would lead to reduced rates
of marriage. However, the wealth-enhancement benefits attendant to
marriage do not promote marriage among the poor and working class, who
rarely own assets, so eliminating them will not further reduce the marriage
rate of that group of people.
The transformative approaches are not without problems. A system that
embeds the dual goal of transformative recognition and redistribution is
not easy to construct and not easily politically feasible. Transformative
remedies are harder to pursue than affirmative remedies because, by their
nature, the former are more revolutionary. Especially in the area of
taxation, major reforms are harder to achieve.369 Another question is what

Preferences, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2787, 2794 (2008).
368. Murray, supra note 69, at 994 (“[M]arriage continues to ensure economic provision and
security, relieving the state of this burden.”).
369. Wendy Richards, An Analysis of Recent Tax Reforms from a Marital-Bias Perspective: It Is
Time to Oust Marriage from the Tax Code, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 611, 648 (2008) (“Usually, the tax
code is altered in small steps, such as those taken in the recent tax reforms, but critics have persistently
called for fundamental reform.”).
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to do until transformative change occurs; some argue that perhaps it is
better to seek incremental (affirmative) change that protects some people
rather than to work for structural change that may never come.370
These valid questions are at the center of every debate regarding social
and legal change. This Article does not offer an answer to this
predicament. Rather, the Article crafts a general vision that could be
useful even in considering small changes in the law; that is, revisions to
specific laws––not only big revolutions––should follow the offered
paradigm.
CONCLUSION
In the nineteenth century, Thomas Piketty observes, “France was a
patrimonial society characterized by a hyperconcentration of capital, in
which inheritance and marriage played a key role and inheriting or
marrying a large fortune could procure a level of comfort not obtainable
through work or study.”371 In a similar fashion, marriage and
intergenerational transfers perform a key role in maintaining and
increasing the wealth inequality in the United States today.
Marriage is one of the causes for such inequality—but can it also be a
corrective? Two related processes occur simultaneously and make
marriage a wealth concentrator. First, as a result of personal taste as well
as socioeconomic structural separation, cross-class marriages are
declining. Second, wealthy people are more likely than any other group to
get married, while the poor are the least likely. These two processes
suggest that marriage will not serve as an effective mechanism for fairer
distribution of wealth. On the contrary, marriage among the wealthy
exacerbates wealth inequality. And for racial minorities, who are the least
likely to marry and to transfer wealth to the next generation, marriage will
not remedy the wealth gap.
Even if the state could change patterns of assortative marriage (and I
doubt if it can in both an effective and constitutional manner), fixing
wealth inequality through marriage is an unsound idea. For far too long,
marriage has served as a vehicle to privatize support—shifting the
responsibility of people’s economic survival from the state to private
individuals. For that reason, making marriage the vehicle for upward
mobility reiterates the same technique: the state renounces its
responsibility to fight inequality and delegates that responsibility to the
370. Id. (“Reforms come in two flavors: small, incremental changes or fundamental, large-scale
reforms . . . . Fundamental reform, while academically popular, is probably the most difficult to
implement. Yet major reform is necessary to remove the marital bias in the code.”).
371. PIKETTY, supra note 21, at 342.
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private choices of individuals. But this does not mean that the state should
not try to address the architecture that encourages class-based assortative
mating. The state has many reasons to promote socioeconomic
integration; wealth inequality is just one of them.
The fact that married couples fare better economically than others
should, alone, call into question the policies that link marriage to the
bundle of wealth escalators and consolidators. Combined with the positive
patterns of assortative mating––where the benefits of marriage are
distributed to those who are already well-off––these policies do not
withstand scrutiny.
To date, scholarship has engaged in relatively little discussion on the
connections between family law and wealth inequality, outside the context
of division of property at the end of marriage. No doubt, the connections
this Article identifies here are only the tip of the iceberg. The hope is that
this Article sparks a conversation about the role of rules pertaining to
families in the preservation of wealth. Indeed, family law scholarship is
changing, from a field focused primarily on marriage, children, and
parents to one that inquires broadly into all aspects of household life.
Boundaries of who is part of the family and which sets of laws are part of
family law as a field are constantly challenged. Within this
transformation, wealth inequality should serve as one of the main frontiers
of family law scholarship.
As a point of departure for future scholarship, the framework of
transformative recognition and redistribution is promising. It engages the
two main harms embedded in the current system: the misrecognition of
diverse family structures (and their inability to build and retain wealth),
combined with the financial injustice grounded in the concentration of
wealth by a few.
Of course, the rules pertaining to family and wealth are resistant to
change. Politically and administratively, the relationship of family to
wealth raises difficult questions whose answers require some creativity.
But this is a time of change. Family law has changed; demography is
constantly changing in a way that renders existing rules inadequate; and
new political forces, as well as scholarship, have placed the issue of
wealth inequality at the center of debate. This offers an opportunity:
transformative changes have already occurred and more are achievable. It
is worthwhile––even imperative––to put this issue at the top of the agenda
of family law scholars and others.

